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This thesis examines the future of India's nuclear weapons posture. 
Since testing a nuclear device in 197 4, India has been able to produce weapons 
material within its civilian nuclear power program. Despite having this nuclear 
weapons capability, India prefers to maintain an ambiguous nuclear posture. 
New pressures in the post-cold war era --the loss of the Soviet Union as a 
strategic ally, the indefinite extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the 
rise of Hindu nationalism, and India's growing participation in the global 
economy-- have the potential to derail India's current nuclear policy. This thesis 
identifies the domestic and international pressures on India, and assesses the 
prospects for India to retain its ambiguous policy, renounce the nuclear option, 
or assemble an overt nuclear arsenal. 
v 
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For over twenty years India has maintained an ambiguous nuclear 
weapons posture. In 197 4 India demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability by 
detonating a nuclear device, and it has the ability to produce weapon-grade 
fissile material within its civilian nuclear program. This thesis identifies post-cold 
war pressures on India and assesses the prospects for India to retain its 
ambiguous policy, renounce the nuclear option, or assemble an overt nuclear 
arsenal. 
The post-cold war period has witnessed new security, political, and 
economic pressures on India's nuclear policy. The loss of the Soviet Union as a 
strategic ally, the indefinite extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the 
rise of Hindu nationalism, and India's growing participation in the global 
economy have the potential to derail India's current nuclear policy of ambiguity. 
I concludes that unless one or more the pressures significantly changes, India is 
likely to maintain an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture. This thesis provides 
the following contingent generalizations concerning the future of India's nuclear 
weapons posture: 
Nuclear Denunciation: 
1. India's civilian nuclear power program contributes to a national energy 
crisis which significantly undermines foreign investment and economic growth. 
xiii 
Currently Indian elites perceive that nuclear technology as the solution rather 
than the source of India's energy deficit. 1 This dichotomy between elite 
perception and reality is attributed to the Indian nuclear bureaucracy long-
standing propaganda campaign esposing the benefits of nuclear energy. If 
Indian elites realize that India's energy shortage is caused by an 
inefficient nuclear power program, denunciation of the nuclear weapons 
option will become more likely. 
2. Pakistan is India's main future adversary. Like India, Pakistan displays 
an ambiguous nuclear posture but, unlike India, has publicly stated that it is 
willing to consider regional arms control. Indo-Pakistani nuclear parity is not in 
India's security interests.2 If India perceives that Indo-Pakistani nuclear 
parity is in Pakistan's best interest, India will strive for a bilateral nuclear 
agreement denouncing nuclear weapons. 
3. The international nuclear nonproliferation regime, embodied by the 
NPT and CTBT, are rejected by most Indians as discriminatory. The NPT and 
CTBT fail to address the global nuclear danger. If the world embraces time-
1 Eighty-seven percent of Indian elites believe that India's nuclear power 
program will help solve the energy crisis. India's nuclear power plants, however, 
provide only three percent of all power generated but deplete the majority of the 
energy department's research and development budget. 
2 Pakistan's nuclear capability prevents India from effectively utilizing its 
conventional advantage and obtaining regional hegemony. 
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bounded global nuclear disarmament negotiations, the possibility of 
Indian inclusion in the NPT and nuclear weapons denunciation will 
become more likely. 
Overt Nuclear Weapons Posture: 
1. In April, 1996 national elections, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) gained the largest percentage, although not a majority, of 
parliamentary seats. The right wing BJP has long advocated an overt Indian 
nuclear posture. Its election manifesto called for the rapid development of 
nuclear weapons as well as missiles to deliver them. The BJP promotes 
hastening the serial production and early deployment of the medium range 
Prithvi and the long range Agni missiles. If the BJP comes to power, with a 
clear majority, an overt nuclear weapons posture becomes more likely. 
2. The absence of Soviet influence in South Asia has two security 
consequences for India. First, India has lost the reassurance of a reliable and 
strong nuclear partner. During the cold war, an overt Indian nuclear posture was 
unnecessary due to the implied security guarantees of the Soviet Union. 
Second, the elimination of Soviet power leaves India in a disadvantageous 
position vis-a-vis China and Pakistan. The presumed Chinese transfer of 
nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan exacerbates India's fear of its 
northern neighbor and may compel India to advance its nuclear weapons 
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efforts. The de-militarization of the Sino-Indian border, however, signals 
improving relations between Beijing and New Delhi. Additionally, India and 
China are improving their economic relations. The maintenance of the Sino-
Indian border agreement is essential to lasting peace between India and China. 
If there is a re-militarization of the Sino-Indian border, relations could 
breakdown and an overt Indian nuclear weapons posture becomes much 
more likely. 
3. India's growing participation in the global economy makes it 
vulnerable to international economic and diplomatic pressures. Most Indians 
perceive internal problems of poverty and ethnic violence as the big threats to 
national security. Fiscal restraints make an overt nuclear weapons posture too 
expensive. An rapidly growing Indian economy, however, would enable Indian 
policy makers to invest more resources in defense. If India's economy 
improves rapidly, with several years of sustained economic growth, an 
overt nuclear weapons posture becomes more likely. 
The end of the cold war provided a fresh start for U.S.-Indian relations. 
The ideological differences of the past have narrowed and many Indians hope 
that the United States and India can forge stronger relations based on mutual 
respect. Improving ties with the United States helps to restrain India's nuclear 
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program by making it more difficult for India to ignore Western calls for arms 
restraint. 
This thesis concludes that India will maintain an ambiguous nuclear 
weapons posture for the foreseeable future. A dramatic change in one or more 
of the described pressures, however, could alter the future of India's nuclear 
policy. This thesis suggests that nonproliferation advocates focus their attention 
on arms control and confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan 
instead of emphasizing international nonproliferation agreements which India 
soundly rejects. 
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I. INDIA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE FACES EMERGING PRESSURES 
A major concern of U.S. foreign policy is the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. In the absence of cold war foreign policy objectives, the 
hindrance of nuclear weapons proliferation is a policy on which most Americans 
agree. One of the most important achievements of the Clinton administration 
was the April 1995 indefinite extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty 
(NPT). A notable non-member of the NPT, however, is India. Despite 
international pressure to become a non-nuclear state, India continues to 
maintain an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture. 
A. INDIA'S AMBIGUOUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 
India has maintained an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture for over 
two decades. In 197 4 India demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability by 
detonating a nuclear device, and it has the ability to produce weapon-grade 
fissile material within its civilian nuclear program. Observers estimate that India 
can quickly assemble several nuclear we~pons. 1 Despite this presumed nuclear 
weapons capability, however, India has refrained from openly deploying nuclear 
weapons or even declaring the possession of nuclear weapons. 
Emerging security, political, international, and economic pressures are 
making it difficult for India to hold on to its ambiguous nuclear weapons posture. 
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 37. 
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This thesis identifies those pressures and assesses the future of India's nuclear 
weapons policy. One observer has suggested that the emerging pressures will 
force India to "move from the current policy of a general engagement in all 
directions to making hard strategic choices."2 Will these pressures force India to 
abandon nuclear weapons? Or will they push India to develop an overt nuclear 
weapons posture? Can an ambiguous nuclear weapon posture endure? 
1. Global and Regional Implications 
India's ambiguous nuclear weapons posture has both regional and global 
implications. South Asian regional use of nuclear weapons concerns policy 
makers. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director James Woolsey testified in 
1993 that South Asia is "the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of 
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons."3 While India has never used, or 
threatened to use, nuclear weapons against its neighbors, the presence of 
nuclear weapons in South Asia, whether clandestine or overt, is troubling. 
India and Pakistan fought three wars prior to either nation obtaining 
nuclear weapons technology.4 In the past decade India and Pakistan 
experienced two major crisis. Although war was avoided, both had the potential 
for nuclear use. 5 
2 C. Raja Mohan, "Asia: The Return of Realpolitik," Hindu 2 February 1996. 
3 Brahma Chellaney, "India," in Mitchell Reiss and RobertS. Litwak, eds., Nuclear 
Proliferation after the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1994), 185. 
4 India and Pakistan fought wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971. 
5 In 1987 the militaries of both nations mobilized when the Indian army conducted 
Brasstacks, a large-scale exercise near the Indo-Pakistani border. In 1990 a crisis 
2 
The United States maintains a policy to cap, reduce, and eventually 
eliminate South Asian nuclear capabilities. While the nuclear capabilities of 
India do not directly threaten the United States, a South Asian nuclear arms race 
is seen as destabilizing. According to U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Joseph 
Nye, the Department of Defense (DOD) views South Asian nonproliferation as a 
high priority: 
DOD views the nuclear capabilities-and the associated ballistic 
missile programs-of India and Pakistan with considerable concern. 
The immediate physical demands on DOD resulting from a nuclear 
exchange between India and Pakistan would be primarily 
environmental and humanitarian as we would anticipate requests 
for disaster relief to include assistance with decontamination. 
DOD, however, must also take into account how the first use of 
nuclear weapons since World War II might affect the calculations 
of states in other regions- states that might use nuclear weapons 
against U.S. interests. As the department of the U.S. Government 
charged with physically defending those interests, it goes without 
saying the DOD places the highest priority on achieving our 
nonproliferation policy objectives in South Asia. "To cap, reduce 
and ultimately eliminate weapons of mass destruction" is not just a 
catchy phrase or an abstract concept. For DOD, it has a very "real 
world" significance. 6 
In addition to the above concerns, India's recent refusal to sign the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) demonstrated India's ability to disrupt 
global arms control agreements. Because India insists that arms control treaties 
address global nuclear disarmament, India's nuclear weapons posture cannot be 
developed over suspected Pakistani assistance to separatist rebels in Kashmir. 
Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh contends that Pakistan loaded nuclear bombs 
aboard F-16's, and that'a potential nuclear exchange was avoided by U.S. diplomatic 
efforts. See Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," The New Yorker, 29 March 
1993. 
6 JosephS. Nye, Jr., testimony before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, 9 March 1995, 4. 
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viewed as merely a regional problem. India's ambiguous nuclear posture affects 
both regional and global nonproliferation efforts. 
2. Predicting the Future 
This thesis considers three possible Indian nuclear weapons policy 
options: 1) nuclear abstinence, 2) the development of an overt nuclear weapons 
capability, and 3) maintaining nuclear ambiguity. This first chapter defines these 
options, and sets out four pressures that will affect India's choice of one option 
over the others. Subsequent chapters analyze the affect of the emerging post-
cold war pressures on India's nuclear decision. I assess how changes in the 
identified pressures on India's policy are likely to affect the future nuclear path 
that India may take. 
3. Kroc Institute Public Opinion Survey 
This thesis utilizes a public opinion survey conducted on one thousand 
Indian elites to illuminate current domestic perceptions of India's nuclear 
weapons posture. The survey, directed by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies, was published in India and the Bomb: Public 
Opinion and Nuclear Options.7 India's nuclear posture is clouded in secrecy and 
not directly affected by the elite opinion. The Kroc survey, however, does 
7 David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, "Indian Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons 
Policy," in David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and the Bomb: Public 
Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 8-
14. The survey questioned one thousand Indian elites drawn from a diverse group of 
professionals, including government civil service, academics, politics, business, 
armed forces, and police. While the respondents accurately represented a cross 
section of Indian elites, the authors of the survey were unable to ascertain opinion 
from Indian decisionmakers and strategic planners. The authors acknowledge that 
secrecy surrounding India's nuclear weapons posture limits the scope of 
understanding India's strategic culture. 
4 
provide an examination of elite nuclear weapons perceptions. These 
perceptions can be attributed, in part, to the Indian governments propaganda 
campaign admonishing the benefits of nuclear technology. An opportunity for 
nonproliferation advocates arise, when there is a dichotomy between elite 
perceptions and reality. Specifically, nonproliferation advocates can point out 
inconsistencies in India's nuclear weapons posture which undermine its national 
interest. 
B. INDIA'S THREE NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Nuclear Abstinence 
India's first policy option is nuclear abstinence. Nuclear abstinence, or 
renunciation, can be conditional, unconditional, bilateral (in conjunction with 
Pakistan),or unilateral.8 This option would most likely, but not necessarily, follow 
an Indian decision to accede to or sign an international agreement, such as the 
NPT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Control Regime 
(FMCR) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
There is today, little support in India for nuclear abstinence. The Kroc 
survey found that just eight percent of elite respondents supported the 
8 Kanti Bajpai, "Abstaining: the Nonnuclear Option" in David Cortright and Amitabh 
Matteo, eds., India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 2. 
5 
renunciation of the nuclear option. 9 The reasons these respondents gave for 
their position are identified in table 1.1.10 
Indian Elites Reasons for Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons 
Nuclear weapons are morally repugnant 
46% 
Nuclear weapons production harms the environment 
41% 
India cannot afford nuclear weapons 
34% 
Nuclear weapons do not address the primary threats to India's 
29% security 
A nuclear India would become the target of the major nuclear 
18% powers 
Table 1-1 
9 Cortright and Matteo, "Indian Public Opinion," 9. 
101bid. 
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The Kroc survey also found that the eight percent of elite Indian nuclear 
opponents is divided over what set of circumstances would warrant an Indian 
nuclear posture. Table 1-2 illustrates those circumstances. 11 
Future Conditions Which Might Justify the Possession of Nuclear 
Weapons 
No Future Condition 60% 
Threats From Other Nuclear 22% 
Powers 
A Nuclear Test By Pakistan 10% 
Table 1-2 
Indian nuclear disarmament groups have little political impact on decision 
makers. First, opposition within India to its nuclear weapons program is formally 
led by a group with small numbers, the New Delhi based Committee for a Sane 
Nuclear Policy. 12 Second, Indian opposition groups to nuclear weapons are 
typically morally-rather than politically-based. 
The nuclear denunciation movement in India is led by Gandhians who 
believe that weapons of mass destruction are "morally repugnant," and that 
nuclear weapons "could never fit within the Mahatma's strict philosophy of 
absolute nonviolence."13 Whatever impact Indian opposition groups might have 
11 Ibid., 11-12. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 Bajpai, "Abstaining: the Nonnuclear Option," 2. 
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is further. diminished because there is little utility for international arms control 
advocates to exploit the groups, as those groups reject the NPT (as do others) 
as discriminatory. 
2. Overt Nuclear Weapons Capability 
The second policy option is the development of an overt nuclear weapons 
capability; there is significant support among Indian elites for this option. Thirty-
three percent of Indian elites support an overt nuclear posture. 14 Varun Sahni 
defines a state as "going nuclear" when "it has developed and deployed nuclear 
weapons. Development, deployment, and declaration are the three essential 
elements of the policy option termed going nuclear. "15 
Supporters of "going nuclear" cite several reasons for the necessity of 
Indian nuclear weapons. Table 1-3 sets out those reasons. 16 
Reasons Why India Should Possess Nuclear Weapons 
Nuclear threats from Pakistan 
54% 
Nuclear weapons improve 
49% India's international 
bargaining power 
Nuclear threats from China 20% 
Table 1-3 
14 Cortright and Matteo, "Indian Public Opinion," 9. 
15 Ibid., 1. 
16 1bid., 11-12. 
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The proceeding table illustrates the perceived lack of concern about 
China as a threat among those favoring an overt nuclear weapons capability. 
This lack of concern has given regional arms control advocates new hope for a 
bilateral Indo-Pakistani non-nuclear agreement. In the past, India has insisted 
that any regional or international agreement must include the Chinese. 
3. Status Quo (Nuclear Ambiguity) 
Maintaining an undeclared and undeployed indigenous nuclear weapons 
capability, without agreeing to any international restraints, satisfies the majority 
of Indian elites. The Kroc survey found that fifty-eight percent of Indian elites 
support India's current policy of nuclear ambiguity. 17 
Supporters of the Indian government's official nuclear policy argue that 
their are benefits of an ambiguous nuclear posture. An ambiguous nuclear 
policy provides a sufficient nuclear deterrent yet avoids the costs of an arms 
race. Additionally, an overt nuclear posture may be perceived as provocative 
while an ambiguous posture maintains the moral high ground of non-aggression. 
India is able to maintain this two-sided policy of nuclear ambiguity with little 
international cynicism because of its Gandhian roots of nonviolence, a robust 
democracy, and strong civilian control, which dampen fears of Indian nuclear 
capability. 
Aabha Dixit of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses concludes 
that India's ambiguous nuclear posture "reflects a prudent mix of idealism and 
pragmatism."18 Nuclear ambiguity allows India to maintain its call for global 
17 Ibid., 9. 
18 Ibid., 3. 
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nuclear disarmament while providing a minimum nuclear deterrent for itself and 
keeping a future nuclear weapons options open. 
C. PRESSURES ON INDIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSTURE 
1. Regional Security Pressures 
This thesis identifies four post-cold war pressures on India's nuclear 
policy. The first pressure on India to alter its nuclear weapons posture concerns 
changes in the regional balance of power. P.R. Chari argues that South Asian 
ambiguous deterrence is precarious due to the end of the cold war and India's 
subsequent loss of the Soviet Union as an ally. 19 The absence of Soviet 
influence in South Asia has two clear security consequences for India. First, 
India has lost the reassurance of a reliable and strong nuclear partner. During 
the cold war an overt Indian nuclear posture was unnecessary due to the implied 
security guarantees of the Soviet Union. Second, the elimination of Soviet 
power leaves South Asia with India as a perceived insufficient balance against 
China and Pakistan. Presumed Chinese transfer of nuclear and missile 
technology to Pakistan exacerbates India's fear of its northern neighbors. 
2. Domestic Political Pressures 
In addition to regional security concerns, there are domestic political 
pressures on India to clarify its nuclear position. The April 1996 national 
elections resulted in the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), gaining the largest percentage, although not a majority, of parliamentary 
19 P.R. Chari, "Indian Defense and Security: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Nuclear 
Proliferation," in Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs 
Versus Benefits, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), 85. 
10 
seats. 20 The right wing BJP has long advocated an overt Indian nuclear posture. 
Its 1996 election manifesto called for the rapid development of nuclear weapons 
as well as a high technology means of delivery. The BJP promotes hastening 
the serial production and early deployment of the medium range Prithvi and the 
long range Agni missiles. Additionally, the BJP disapproves of all international 
agreements designed to limit India's nuclear program. 21 While the BJP's position 
on Indian nuclear weapons policy may alarm Western analysts, 22 its position is 
by no means considered extreme in India. It enjoys significant public support. 
3. International Pressures 
A third pressure acting on India's nuclear weapons policy is the increased 
effort of the international community to combat the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Along with Israel and historical adversary, Pakistan, India has 
refused to sign the NPT. Pakistan has consistently stated that it will accept 
international constraints on its nuclear weapons program with bilateral 
agreements from India. Western nonproliferation advocates consider this Indian 
cooperation to be the key ingredient in South Asian arms control. India recently 
displayed its power and resolve against international efforts aimed at curtailing 
its nuclear option by vetoing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
20 A national news magazine, India Today, provides election results and analysis in 
its April 15, 1996 issue. 
21 
"Missiles Among Top Priorities for New Indian Government," International News. 16 
May 1996. 
22 U.S. nonproliferation experts Leonard Spector and Micheal Krepon claim that the 
BJP's nuclear weapons position would cause a dangerous arms race if they ever 
came to power. "US Stand On BJP Nuclear Policy Viewed," Navbharat Times, 5 April 
1993, 4. 
11 
4. Economic Pressures 
Finally, Indian policy makers face hard economic realities when 
considering their nuclear weapons posture. Indian economic reforms, which 
include an increased dependence on foreign investment, make international 
acceptance and cooperation essential to financial stability. An Indian nuclear 
weapons posture deemed irresponsible and provocative by the international 
community could seriously endanger the foreign investment that Indian seeks. 
D. SUMMARY 
The future of India's nuclear weapons posture has implications for 
regional and global security and nuclear weapons proliferation. While India has 
maintained an ambiguous posture for over twenty years, it faces profound new 
challenges. While the majority of Indian elites continue to favor the official 
policy of nuclear ambiguity, there are emerging security, political, international, 
and economic pressures which demand change. 
The following chapters provide three possible outcomes of development 
in India's nuclear weapons posture. Additionally, each chapter provides 
contingent generalizations of future changes in the pressures could affect India's 
nuclear weapons posture. Chapter II argues that the post-cold war environment 
has produced conditions well suited for Indian nuclear weapons denunciation. 
Chapter Ill contends that an overt nuclear weapons posture will be India's most 
likely option in the future. Chapter IV argues that the emergence of post- cold 
12 
war pressures will constrain India from an overt nuclear weapons declaration, 
and India will continue to maintain its nuclear option thereby preserving 
ambiguity. 
This thesis concludes in the final chapter that India is likely to maintain an 
ambiguous nuclear weapons posture, all things remaining equal. A dramatic 
change in one or more of the described pressures, however, may potentially 
affect the future of India's nuclear policy. The concluding chapter speculates 
how hypothetical changes in South Asia may influence India's nuclear decision 
and offers implications for U.S. policy makers and nonproliferation advocates. 
13 
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II. NUCLEAR ABSTINENCE 
"So far as I can see, the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has 
sustained mankind for ages. " 
-Mahatma Gandhi23 
A. EMERGING POST- COLD WAR PRESSURES 
India has a long tradition of opposition to nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, 
India exploded a nuclear device in 197 4 and has maintained a nuclear weapons 
option for over twenty years. India claims it is categorically opposed to nuclear 
weapons, and seeks to lead the fight for complete global nuclear disarmament. 
These assertions persist despite the existence of India's nuclear weapons 
capability and its isolated position against certain international arms control 
initiatives. 
The global condition which must be met for Indian acquiescence to the 
NPT and abandonment of its nuclear option is clear. India consistently 
advocates that global arms control agreements should include a strict timetable 
requiring nuclear weapons states to reduce and eventually destroy their 
stockpiles. This compulsory condition must be met for Indian inclusion in a 
global arms control regime. Given the rising global confidence in nuclear 
deterrence, the power characteristics of the international system, and the 
common belief that the world cannot "put the nuclear genie back in the bottle," 
the realization of India's objective of global disarmament seems remote in the 
near term. 
23 India and Disarmament: An Anthology of Selected Writings and Speeches, (New 
Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 
1988), 14. 
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This chapter analyzes how the emergence of post-cold war pressures 
contributes to arguments calling for Indian nuclear weapons denunciation. 24 
Notwithstanding the weakness of India's nuclear denunciation movement,25 the 
emergence of new post-cold war pressures on India's nuclear program provides 
three strong motives for India to abandon its ambiguous nuclear weapons 
option. Additionally, this chapter provides contingent generalizations of future 
conditions which could signal that India will abandon its nuclear weapons option. 
First, security pressures encourage the nuclear abstinence option 
because such a policy would eliminate Indo-Pakistani nuclear parity. This would 
allow India to strengthen its conventional forces and gain regional dominance. 
Second, the end of cold war UN Security Council gridlock has given way to 
immense global nonproliferation efforts. International pressure on India's 
nuclear posture increases Indian fears of international isolation and sanctions. 
Third, an outward looking, reformed Indian economy places new monetary 
demands on India's civilian nuclear program as well as its conventional armed 
forces, enhancing the benefits of nuclear denunciation. 
B. REGIONAL SECURITY PRESSURES 
Some critics claim that India's ambiguous nuclear policy undermines regional 
security.26 This argument is based on the contention that nuclear weapons not 
24 This chapter does not examine political pressures on the nuclear abstinence 
option as such pressures generally are ineffectual. India's nuclear abstinence 
movement is small and is morally, rather than politically, based; thus having little 
impact on policy makers. 
25 Only eight percent of Indian elites think that abandonment of the nuclear weapons 
option is a good idea. Bajpai, "Abstaining: the Nonnuclear Option." 
26 The leading Indian opponents to a nuclear weapons option are Braful Bidwai, 
Aachin Vanaik, Kanti Bajpai, and Ravi Rikhye. 
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only fail to play a significant role in regional conflicts, but also serve to divert 
resources from more important conventional forces. 27 To understand the 
regional security pressures that might influence India to adopt a policy of nuclear 
abstinence, it is necessary to review India's vision of regional hegemony. 
1. India's Strategic Vision 
In foreign policy India has pursued non-alignment and self-sufficiency. 
India seeks "to preserve the country's autonomy of action as an independent 
power center in the international system."28 RAND analystAshley Tellis 
describes India's strategic vision as that of a "great power" with "hegemonic 
status" in South Asia. 29 Pakistan, not China, is seen as the primary obstacle to 
Indian strategy. Tellis observes that Pakistan represents "the principal 
impediment to India's core grand strategic objective: thriving as a great power, 
with all the security accruing from the possession of that status (emphasis 
added)."30 
Pakistan, Tellis notes, upsets South Asian natural geographical unity by 
creating a substantial military force which undermines Indian regional 
hegemony. Additionally, the creation of an Islamic state challenges the 
27 In contrast, the pronuclear argument contends that India's ambiguous nuclear 
posture offers deterrent value toward China and Pakistan and that adversaries 
seriously consider India's nuclear weapons capability before threatening India's 
national interest. 
28 Chari, "Indian Defense and Security," 84. 
29 Ashley J. Tellis, "South Asia," in Salmay Khalilzad, ed., Strategic Appraisal1996 
(Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1996), 283-307. 
30 Ibid., 285. 
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legitimacy of India's "diverse regional, linguistic, and cultural .::.Jbgroups."31 
Given Indian strategic objectives, Indo-Pakistani military parity, including nuclear 
parity is unacceptable to India. 
2. Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Parity 
In their fifty years of independence, India and Pakistan have fought three 
major wars; they continue to dispute the status of Kashmir. The relative 
strength of India's conventional forces has kept Pakistani desires of an Islamic 
unification with the Muslim majority population in Kashmir at bay. A reduction in 
India's conventional capabilities helps fuel Pakistani hopes of obtaining control 
of Kashmir. 
In his 1990 book, The Militarization of Mother India, Ravi Rikhye, a self-
described hawk, argues that India's strategic goals, political will, and defense 
spending are inharmonious. He claims that an Indian annual defense budget of 
six percent of its GNP is insufficient to support India's strategic goals of regional 
hegemony.32 He also claims that India's defense budget exceeds the amount 
needed for a purely defensive posture. 
Rikhye prescribes that India should increase its defense spending and 
acquire the means to project its regional will. 33 Nuclear weapons, having 
31 Ibid. 
32 India's defense budget has recently declined to an expenditure of only three 
percent of the national GNP. Avirook Sen, "Casualties of Funds Crunch," India 
Today, 15 October 1996, 92. 
33 Ravi Rikhye, The Militarization of Mother India, (New Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 
1990), 5. 
18 
proven little utility beyond that of deterrence, take away from the conventional 
forces which can influence events in South Asia. Rikhye notes, 
Nuclear weapons are intended for deterrence: if they're used, it's 
mutual suicide and no purpose has been served. You have to 
convince the other person that you very well might use them if 
you're pushed too far, so he shouldn't take the chance. 34 
Further, Rikhye argues that India needs to secure its conventional superiority 
over its adversary Pakistan. Conventional arms have a deterrent effect as well 
as military utility. 
It is hard to see what particular advantage nuclear weapons would 
have over the newer precision-guided weapons. Two missiles 
creating a 600 psi over pressure against the Enterprise deck or 
sides is going to create as much of a problem as a nuclear 
weapon. 35 
Bilateral ambiguous nuclear deterrence allows Pakistan to stand toe to 
toe with India. This condition of Indo-Pakistani balance is unlikely without the 
presence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons allow Indo-Pakistani military 
parity which undermines India's strategic goals of regional hegemony. 
Despite international efforts to curb a Pakistani nuclear program, it is 
able to match India's ambiguous deterrent. Most experts agree that the lack of 
available fissile material makes its presumed nuclear stockpile much smaller 
than India's. Numbers, however, are not that important when considering a 
minimal nuclear deterrent.36 Pakistan needs to provide only the remote 
34 Ibid., 99. 
35 lbid., 101. 
36 For a comprehensive discussion of Indian and Pakistani nuclear sufficiency see 
Gregory F. Giles, John H. Sandrock, and Lewis A. Dunn, "Nuclear Weapons and 
Doctrine in India and Pakistan," (prepared for Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory by the Science Application International Corporation, 1993). 
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possibility of possessing a nuclear weapon to effectively nullify India's 
conventional advantage. 
Ironically, the strategic parity that Pakistan enjoys is best described by a 
nuclear advocate, former Indian Army Chief of Staff, General K Sundarji. 
Sundarji argues that an asymmetrical conventional advantage favoring India is 
useless. He argues, 
even if India were foolish enough to create a large conventional 
edge, it would be unusable for undoing Pakistan, because of the 
near certainty that Pakistan would then use its nuclear weapons in 
extremis. 37 
Sundarji elaborates this contention in his novel, Blind Men of Hindoostan. 
In his fictional work, Sundarji describes an Indo-Pakistani crisis which parallels 
the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Kashmir crisis. The crisis occurs when Pakistan 
"crosses the line" in its covert, yet substantial, support for separatist rebels in 
Kashmir. Sundarji's novel asserts that Pakistan has engaged in a covert support 
of guerrillas in Kashmir for years. 
In Sundarji's crisis, however, Pakistan risks a broader war with India when 
it provides regular Pakistani army troops for electronic warfare and anti-
helicopter support. Indian strategy demands that India not limit its response to 
an increased presence in Kashmir. Sundarji contends that this crisis leads to a 
broader conventional Indian attack in the heart of Pakistan. 
Sundarji anticipates that India would use its conventional strength to 
punish Pakistan for supporting the Kashmiri rebels. This scenario, however, 
tempts Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons in a preventive manner (against 
37 General K Sundarji, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," in John Gjelstan and Olav 
Njolstan, eds., Nuclear Rivalrv and International Order, (Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute, 1996), 180. 
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presumed Indian nuclear weapons facilities and airfields), in a tactical manner 
(against advancing Indian troops), and as a weapon of terror (against Indian 
cities). 
India's current ambiguous nuclear weapons posture is insufficient to deter 
Pakistan from any of the above nuclear weapons use. Sundarji points out that 
conventional tactics require the concentration of force which makes India's 
troops easy prey to Pakistani nuclear weapons. 38 The Indo-Pakistani 
conventional asymmetry is nullified by a presumed Pakistani nuclear bomb. 
While this fictitious example calls for Indian nuclear clarity, I believe his 
scenario best supports those who favor regional nuclear arms control. Sundarji 
contends that an overt Indian nuclear posture would prevent Pakistani use of a 
nuclear device against invading Indian troops. The events of the real 1990 
Kashmir crisis, however, indicate that India was deterred from using its 
conventional advantage. 39 Therefore, one can argue that Pakistan's presumed 
nuclear capabilities prevent India from flexing its conventional muscle. 
Sundarji's fictional work, as well as the events of the 1990 crisis, 
demonstrate that regional arms control in the form of bilateral nuclear abstinence 
would better serve India's regional interests. A bilateral Indo-Pakistani nuclear 
agreement would eliminate Pakistan's ability to achieve strategic parity and 
strengthen Indian hegemony in South Asia. Specifically the elimination of 
Pakistani nuclear capabilities allows India to utilize its conventional military 
against Pakistan without the threat of nuclear retaliation. 
38 General K Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan: lndo-Pak Nuclear War (New Delhi: 
UBS Publishers, 1993). 
39 It is yet unclear why India backed down from the 1990 Kashmir conflict. 
Investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh, argues that Pakistani actions signaled India 
that Pakistan was ready to use nuclear weapons, compelling India to de-escalate the 
conflict. See Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge." 
21 
3. Unilateral Indian Nuclear Renunciation 
The previous argument contends that a Indo-Pakistani renunciation of 
nuclear weapons allows India to use its conventional asymmetry to reinforce 
regional hegemony over Pakistan. Kanti Bajpai, believes this is a harmful 
strategy. Bajpai argues that South Asian peace and security requires a bilateral 
non-nuclear agreement as well as a "leveling down" of conventional forces. 40 
Bajpai asserts an imbalance in conventional forces favoring India allows 
Pakistan to argue that, 
it is cheaper to match India's conventional superiority with nuclear 
capability than with increased conventional capability. Leveling 
down to a conventional balance which satisfies both sides and 
which avoids a costly arms race can overcome this objection.41 
Bajpai suggests that India renounce nuclear weapons unilaterally. This 
would undermine hawks in the Pakistani government who perceive conflict with 
India as inevitable. Bajpai notes that India as the stronger power is in a better 
position to take this radical step. "When the weaker state calls off a cold war it 
will be seen as defeat; when the stronger-state does so, it must be a gesture of 
friendship. "42 
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C. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 
The strongest pressure on India's nuclear weapons posture is the 
mounting international pressure exhibited in the indefinite extension of the 
nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). The recent acceptance of the NPT and 
CTBT by China and France has left India as the isolated standout against these 
international agreements.43 Its most recent refusal to sign the CTBT highlights 
India's lone stance against the rest of the world. 
Rikhye argues that any prestige gained by demonstrating nuclear 
weapons capability is outweighed by the unprecedented global consensus 
against nuclear proliferation. He writes, 
If it is prestige that we wanted, we should have nuclearised in the 
late 1960s. The people would have been impressed. Now, with 
the whole world building up a massive sentiment against these 
weapons, rather than any prestige to be gained from going nuclear, 
we are likely to get only disgust.44 
Despite the global momentum generated by the indefinite extension of the NPT, 
most Indians continue to reject this arms control agreement and prefer an 
international agreement which would eliminate the existence of nuclear 
weapons. 45 
43 India, Pakistan, and Israel refuse to sign the NPT. Pakistan vows it will sign both 
the NPT and CTBT if India signs. Israel has agreed to the CTBT leaving India as the 
only nation able to prevent the treaty from coming into force. 
44 Rikhye, The Militarization of Mother India, 101. 
45 83 % of Indian elites "totally support" an global nuclear weapons disarmament 
treaty. Cortright and Matteo, "Indian Public Opinion." 
23 
1 .. NPT Opposition 
India has a long-standing history against discriminatory arms control 
agreements. India's policy, which insists that arms control treaties address 
underlying motivations for conflict, were formed before the advent of nuclear 
weapons. In 1940 Prime Minister Nehru argued that arms control agreements 
must deal with the underlying motivations for conflict and must apply universally 
to all nations. Five years before the existence of nuclear weapons, Nehru wrote, 
Complete disarmament means in essence the ending of wars 
between national states. This will only take place when the causes 
of such wars have been eliminated or reduced very greatly. If the 
causes remain, there will be continuous conflict. ... If real 
disarmament is to come, it is essential therefore to tackle this 
problem and to remove these causes of conflict and war. These 
causes are many, but briefly they may be summed up as the 
suppression of one nation by another, of large masses of people 
by privileged groups, of the uneven distribution of the world's 
resources which are essential for modern life in any state, of the 
inequalities between nation and nation and group and group, of 
haves and have-nots as between nations as well as between 
groups or classes. 46 
India's stance against the NPT and CTBT is shared by nuclear advocates, 
ambiguity supporters, and nuclear opponents. These international treaties, 
Indians argue, legitimize the presence of nuclear weapons. Indians claim that 
the motives of the nuclear weapons states in the NPT are disingenuous. Indians 
claim that their stance against these treaties is categorically "anti-nuclear" and 
not designed in support of their country's nuclear program. 
India protests both the discriminatory and legitimizing nature of the NPT 
and CTBT. The NPT restricts the transfer of fissile materials from a nuclear 
weapons state to a non-nuclear weapons state. India protested in the 1970's 
46 India and Disarmament, (Confidential note written at Wardha)25 August 1940,11. 
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and 1980's, that the United States failed to uphold thJs principle by deploying 
nuclear weapons to allied territories in Europe. The U.S. claims that the 
deployment of a nuclear weapon in an allied territory does not constitute a 
nuclear weapons transfer and that control and title of the weapons remains with 
the United States. India, however, claims that examination of NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group doctrine contradicts these claims, and remains convinced of the 
disingenuous nature of the NPT. 
Additional opposition to the NPT, which continues today, claims that the 
NPT justifies the presence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five nuclear 
weapons states but does nothing to eliminate nuclear weapons. K. 
Subrahmanyam, a former administrator in India's defense ministry writes: 
If the superpowers did not intend to carry out the provisions of the 
Treaty why did they sponsor it and what did they achieve through 
it? The sole purpose underlying the sponsorship of the Treaty was 
to get their nuclear weapon stockpiles legitimized by the comity of 
nations. The nations which have acceded to the Treaty have 
accepted the legitimacy of the nuclear weapons in the hands of five 
nuclear weapon countries. 47 
Subrahmanyam further contends that the NPT is an agreement bent on 
maintaining rather than limiting nuclear capabilities. He claims that nuclear-
weapons-free zones legitimize the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states and 
condones nuclear weapons use. He accuses Pakistani leadership of 
47 K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing 
House, 1982), 78. 
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contributing to nuclear weapons legitimization by favoring these discriminatory 
arms control agreements. The Indian policy, he claims 
is principled and practical, and aimed at bringing about an 
international convention to ban the use and threat of use of nuclear 
weapons. The Pakistani policy is one of legitimizing the nuclear 
arsenals, including, consequently, the Israeli and South African 
arsenals.48 
2. CTBT Opposition 
India's stance against the CTBT is characterized by a similar argument. A 
test ban treaty locks in the capabilities of the nuclear weapons states without 
requiring a reduction or freeze on the quantity of weapons. India presented this 
argument in rejecting the CTBT in the summer of 1996. India claims its 
objectives for a test ban treaty have always been linked to eventual 
disarmament. The CTBT fails to meet this Indian litmus test. The language 
concerning nuclear disarmament in the treaty's preamble is weak. It suggests 
that a nuclear test ban may someday lead to disarmament, conceding that the 
abolition of nuclear weapons is not its primary purpose. India's ambassador to 
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, cites the failure of a 
time-table for disarmament and new counter-proliferation utilities for nuclear 
weapons, as reason for India's dissent. -
Substantive disarmament provisions in the treaty have been 
blocked by some delegations. Weak and woefully inadequate 
preamble references to nuclear disarmament such as those 
contained in the draft cannot meet our concerns. 49 
48 Ibid., 168-69. 
49 Arundhati Ghose quoted in George Perkovich, "India's Nuclear Weapons Debate: 
Unlocking the Door to the CTBT," Arms Control Today (May/June 1996), 11. 
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Additionally, Ambassador Ghose mentioned with alarm, "new doctrines 
and targeting strategies being developed for nuclear weapons which are 
attracting consideration for use against chemical or biological attack."50 Ghose 
answered India's critics who claim that India's stance on the CTBT is 
inconsistent with past Indian calls for a test ban treaty. Stating that India's 
position has always been consistent to an end of global disarmament, Ghose 
stated, "This was not the CTBT India envisaged in 1954. This cannot be the 
CTBT that India can be expected to accept. "51 
3. Implications for NPT and CTBT Advocates 
India's opposition to the NPT and CTBT must be taken seriously. Many 
Western arms control advocates claim that India's stance against the NPT in 
favor of real global disarmament is unrealistic and impractical. Nevertheless, the 
failure of the NPT and CTBT to adequately satisfy Indian desires for a nuclear 
free world undermines global nonproliferation. The international community has 
been thus far unsuccessful at compelling India to forgo its nuclear option. The 
United States has began to employ nuclear arms control and confidence-
building methods rather than depending strictly on a policy of nonproliferation. 
U.S. and international pressure on India may help strengthen its stance 
against the NPT. Akhtar Ali, a South Asian nuclear expert, concludes that 
nonproliferation efforts have only strengthened India's stance and that new 
strategies need to be developed. "The nonproliferation community in the U.S. 
50 Ibid., 11. 
51 K.K. Katyal, "PM's Reply to U.S. to Reaffirm Stand on CTBT," Hindu, 30 June 
1996. 
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needs to adopt a less activist approach in favor of a more realistic effort, at least 
in so far as South Asia is concerned. "52 
Former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, agrees and 
provides suggestions for a more realistic Western approach to South Asian 
nonproliferation. "Continued rigid adherence to an orthodox but increasingly 
obsolescent approach, risks delaying serious attention to preventing a major 
security threat. "53 Oakley suggests that the United States abandon its stated 
claim for formalized South Asian nuclear denunciation. Instead, U.S. diplomats 
should work "quietly" and "privately" with both India and Pakistan to convince 
them to freeze their current programs rather than altogether forgo the nuclear 
weapons option. 
Alternative compliance and confidence-building measures, 
pursuing longer-term nonproliferation approaches that rely on quiet 
dialogue rather than formalized treaties, should therefore be 
examined. Informal reassurances like those reached among the 
United States, Russia, and Ukraine-which led to Ukraine's 
denuclearization could serve as a precedent. 54 
These international pressures -- Indian isolationism and continued efforts by the 
global community on India to renounce its nuclear capability-- may operate to 
move India in the direction of nuclear abstinence. 
52 Akhtar Ali, "A Framework for Nuclear Agreement and Verification," in Stephen 
Philip Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms 
Control, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), 267. 
53 Robert B. Oakley and Jed C. Snyder, "Escalating Tensions in South Asia," 




D. ECONOMIC PRESSURES 
This section argues that the economic cost of India's nuclear program 
justifies denunciation of nuclear weapons. While the majority of Indian elites do 
not share this perspective, 55 this section asserts that India's civilian nuclear 
program and nuclear weapons aspirations significantly undermines the potential 
of its growing economy. 56 The high costs of India's civilian nuclear energy 
program contribute to a national energy deficit which inhibits the growth of the 
Indian economy. 
1. High Costs of a Nuclear Weapons Option 
The costs of nuclear weapons threaten India's security by undermining its 
economy, making it more susceptible to internal threats. George Perkovich, a 
South Asian expert, argues that India's security is better enhanced by 
strengthening its economy rather than developing nuclear weapons. He 
contends that "India cannot achieve sustained rapid development and raise the 
living of its 930 million citizens without international cooperation and 
investment."57The costs of building a nuclear arsenal would significantly 
undermines India's economy. 
Arguably, there are economic costs and benefits of nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear weapons provide a significant amount of military power at relatively low 
55 Eighty-seven percent of India's elites believe that its civilian nuclear energy 
program can help meet India's energy deficit and 60 percent believe that nuclear 
energy benefits far outweigh its costs. Cortright and Matteo, "Indian Public Opinion." 
56 India's economy is currently growing at ten percent annually. 
57 George Perkovich, "India's Nuclear Weapons Debate," 13. 
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costs. The "more bang for the buck" argument only works, however, if there is 
political utility in having nuclear weapons and they are directed towards clear 
security threats. In the case of India, nuclear weapons and India's subsequent 
refusal to agree to arms control have contributed to political isolation which 
undermines its economic potential. 
2. India's Changing Economic Policies: From Economic 
Nationalism to Global Interdependence 
The cold war provided India with the Soviet Union as a political and 
military ally which reduced the impact of global isolation. Post-cold war Indian 
economics, however, require the full participation of India in the global economy. 
India's new interest in the global economy makes it more vulnerable to 
international embargo and isolation, and focuses India's efforts on improving its 
infrastructure, rather than increasing military power. Former Defense Minister, 
Arun Singh argues: 
India has come to recognize the fact that multi- dimensional 
economic and technological global interdependence is vital to the 
improvement of living conditions for its own population and internal 
instabilities are best tackled by creating a democratic environment 
conducive to achieving visible and meaningful economic progress 
rather than through the acquisition and demonstration of State 
power. 58 
58Arun Singh, "Indian National Security-A Viewpoint," in New Approaches to South 
Asian Security (National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies) 
19 September, 1996, 9. 
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India's economic reforms make international cooperation and foreign investment 
important for India's growth. Any Indian behavior deemed provocative by the 
international community could jeopardize its economic future. 
Cold war Indian economic policy was a product of nationalism, socialism, 
and a rejection of Western economics. Indian politician, Subramanian Swamy, 
rejected western economic thought as irrelevant to India. He proclaimed 
policies he termed "economic nationalism." Economic nationalism consists of 
self-reliance, high growth rate, and nuclear weapons. 59 
Many of India's cold war economic policies were rooted in political goals 
of non-alignment. Indian economic strategies consisted of "growth through 
capital accumulation and increased per capita income."60 India utilized Soviet 
style five year plans which "were based on a strategy of massive industrialization 
and capital accumulation."61 
Understandably, the elimination of poverty was an important economic 
goal. The strategy employed to reach this goal was "based on achieving growth 
through the accumulation of capital. .. reduction in poverty was not to be a trickle-
down effect of growth; poverty alleviation-was to be achieved though active 
intervention in the type and level of growth."62 Foreign investment was viewed 
59 Subramanian Swamy, Indian Economic Planning: An Alternative Approach (New 
York: Barnes & Noble, 1971),1. 
60 Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, "The Indian Awakening," SWAI Review, (Winter-
Spring, 1994), 139. 
61 Ibid. 
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suspiciously as Western powers tried to link economic aid and investment with 
Indian acquiescence to Soviet containment and Western political alignment. 53 
Indian economists believed in the socialist economic model, thus foreign 
investment was not necessary for India to improve its economic status. 
Furthermore, some believed that foreign investment undermined India's goals. 
Swamy adamantly argued against foreign aid and assistance, which he claimed 
hurt the Indian economy as it restricted who India could buy from and what India 
did with their products.64 In general, cold war Indian economists felt immune to 
Western pressure. Policy makers believed that Indian participation in the global 
economy wasn't necessary. In contrast to Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, they 
"felt that India was a large enough country to support sufficiently large markets 
within its geographical boundaries."65 
Post-cold war Indian economic policies follow a different path. Indian 
policy makers now realize that improving their economies is necessary for 
domestic stability. They accept, 
that their inward-looking, centrally planned economic policies have 
failed, while the countries that have prospered around the globe 
are those with dynamic private sectors. 66 
62 1bid. 
63 Robert McMahon provides a comprehensive discussion on India's cold war 
relations with the United States in The Cold War on the Peripherv: The United States, 
India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
64 Swamy, Indian Economic Planning, 24. 
65 Gangopadhyay, "The Indian Awakening," 141. 
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In-order to increase economic growth, India has decentralized state run 
industries and promoted foreign investment. It is still unclear whether a 
possible coalition government of the United Front will continue economic reforms 
started in 1991 by the Congress Party. Nevertheless, Indian economists have 
come a long way in rejecting the centralized, anti-foreign investment policies 
advocated by Swamy. India's economic future, however, continues to be 
undermined by the third theme of Swamy's economic nationalism, nuclear 
weapons. This section argues that while the economies of the nuclear weapons 
states have flourished while developing nuclear weapons, India's nuclear power 
and weapons program significantly undermines its economy. 
3. The Impact of Defense Expenditures on Industrial 
Capacity 
India's annual defense spending averages less than four percent of its 
GNP. Some argue, however, that money spent on India's nuclear weapons 
program and defense is harmful. Kathleen Bailey argues that the development 
of nuclear weapons is such an enormous task that human resources allotted to 
nuclear programs could be better spent. 
There is no way to estimate the cost of nuclear proliferation to India 
or Pakistan, for example, but it is safe to say that the economic 
development of both was seriously- set back by the drain of 
exceptional personnel to weapons development and production. 67 
Paul Kennedy offers a complementary argument of the perils of Indian 
weapons development. He contends that allocation of human resources on 
military technologies undermines "opportunities for commercial science and 
66 Charles H. Percy, "South Asia's Take-Off," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992-
93), 170. 
67 Kathleen C. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation, (San Francisco: 
Westview Press, 1993), 99. 
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(civilian) technology."68 Subsequently, the failing industrial and technology 
sections are unable to provide suitable employment, henceforth talented and 
trained personnel emigrate to the developed world. Both Bailey's and Kennedy's 
differing definitions of "brain drain" lead to the same conclusion. Resources 
(both financial and human) spent in weapons development undermine the 
industrial capacity of India. 
Despite the persuasiveness of these arguments, a study conducted by 
economist and South Asian expert, Robert Looney, concludes that India's 
defense expenditures do not have a negative impact on India's economic 
growth.69 Looney conducted a study of the causality between defense 
expenditures and gross domestic product in South Asia. Utilizing two twenty-
year sub-periods, 1957-1977 and 1967-1987, Looney concluded that "the impact 
of defense growth was positive, with growth not significantly influencing the 
government's allocation to the military. "70 His findings indicate that India's 
modest defense expenditures are not a contributing factor in India's slow growth 
and troublesome economy. Looney's conclusions are consistent with other 
economic studies which conclude "that investment and government spending 
both have a positive impact on growth. "71 
68 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Centurv; (New York: Random House, 
1993), 181. . 
69 Robert E. Looney, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Performance In South 
Asia: Tests of Causality and Interdependence," Conflict Management and Peace 
Science, 11, no. 2 (1991), 37-67. 
70 Ibid., 59. 
71 Ibid., 60. 
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4 .. India's Energy Crisis 
Although Looney's study indicates that India's defense expenditures are 
not a direct cause of its sluggish economy, there is strong evidence that its 
nuclear power program directly harms India's potential economic growth. India's 
nuclear power program, which supplies fissile material for nuclear weapons, has 
led to a long standing energy crisis which undermines privatization and foreign 
investment. Thomas Smith demonstrates the nature of India's energy crisis and 
the significant implications for India's future. "India has endured a crisis in 
electricity supply for over twenty years, and the problems for the country could 
become more severe in the future."72 Smith argues that the implications of its 
energy crisis precludes any significant improvement in the Indian economy. 
The growth of electric power capacity closely correlates with 
increases in GNP and an adequate power supply is a prime 
infrastructure priority for countries seeking to attract and hold 
foreign investment and sustain rapid economic growth. 73 
For over twenty years India has produced an average of ten to twelve 
percent less electric power than Indian consumers demand. 74 The ten percent 
electrical deficit does not do justice to the scope of the problem. Smith points 
out that the official estimated demand is probably lower than desired amount of 
Indian electrical power. 75 
72 Thomas B. Smith, "India's Electric Power Crisis: Why Do the Lights Go Out?" Asian 
Survey 33, no. 4 (April1993}, 376. --
73 1bid. 
74 Ibid., 377 
75 1bid. 
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Much of India's energy crisis can be blamed on a disproportionate amount 
of resources invested in nuclear power. Indian nuclear power plants take 
decades to build and are disproportionately expensive when compared to their 
conventional counterparts. Smith notes that, 
Over thirty percent of India's total research and development 
budget in science and technology has been spent on atomic 
energy-nearly as much as on agriculture. In the sixth Plan, R&D 
on atomic energy (not including the operational and construction 
costs of reactors) amounted toRs. 5.336 billion, (213 million USD) 
while the entire R&D budget on other forms of power was to be 
only Rs. 250 million.(25 million USD)76 
Despite this enormous investment, nuclear power plants provide only 
three percent of consumed electricity. The remainder of India's electric power is 
generated in coal burning thermal plants (62%) and in hydroelectric plants 
(35%).77 The poor performance of India's nuclear power plants and subsequent 
energy crisis is a direct result of its refusal to sign the NPT and accept IAEA 
safeguards. 
The 197 4 test of a nuclear device and subsequent refusal to sign the NPT 
has had lasting negative impact on India's nuclear power production. General 
Electric built two nuclear reactors at Tarapur in 1969. Two reactors were built by 
Canada (CANDU) in Rajasthan. India used the Canadian design to build two 
additional reactors at Madras. There are two more reactors in Narora in Uttar 
Pradesh and eight additional plants of 235 MW each are planned. Following 
76 1bid. 
77 Ibid., 379 
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India's nuclear test in 197 4, India has been subjected to numerous nuclear fuel 
embargoes and has subsequently had to develop its own heavy water for the 
coolant in its CANDU reactors. India's indigenous heavy water production has 
been exceptionally inefficient and heavy water production often lags behind 
demand.78 
The privatization of India's power generation industry, the development of 
gas power plants, and innovative ways to improve efficiency may provide 
enough confidence to keep foreign interests investing in India. Recent U.S. 
investments in the Indian economy have grown to 700 million in 1995, from 32 
million ten years earlier. 79 Some fear, however, that energy production may not 
be able to keep pace with the new demands of foreign investment. The 
proliferation of electronic products and the public's demand for new technology 
will continue to pressure India's energy industry. 80 
Despite the argument that India's nuclear weapons and nuclear power 
program has led to an energy crisis which subsequently undermines the future of 
its economy, most Indian elites have strong confidence in the benefits of nuclear 
power. Eighty-seven percent of respondents said they believe that the civilian 
nuclear energy program can help meet India's energy deficit. Only twenty-one 
78 Ibid., 377 
79 John F. Burns, "India Now Winning U.S. Investment," New York Times, 6 February 
95. 
80 
"Power sector, Now at the Crossroads," Hindu, 20 May 1996, 25. 
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percent conclude, as this paper argues, that the costs of a civilian nuclear 
energy program far outweigh its benefits. 81 
The dichotomy between the perceived benefits of Indian nuclear power 
and its actual costs is a result of the proliferation of nuclear myths. 82 Proponents 
of atomic energy has successfully convinced the citizens of India that nuclear 
power is a cheap and reliable source of electrical power. Smith notes that India's 
nuclear bureaucracy has convinced every prime minister India can impress the 
world with its nuclear technology. 83 
Proponents of Indian atomic energy, however, may be losing influence. 
India's civilian nuclear power program has faced significant budget cuts in recent 
years. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists notes that the government has cut 
funding on science and technology by 50 percent since 1988 and that the atomic 
energy's budget has taken a disproportionate hit, falling more than 70 percent in 
constant dollars.84 While India's veto of the CTBT signals that India has not 
completely abandoned its nuclear aspirations, declining dollars and poor 
performance by India's nuclear program has undermined its influence on 
national decisionmakers. 85 
81 Cortright and Matteo, "Indian Public Opinion," appendix B, 7. 
82 For a discussion of nuclear myths and Indian nuclear myth makers see, Peter R. 
Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, 
volume 2, numbers 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993). 
83 Smith, "India's Electric Power Crisis," 389. 
84 Eric Arnett, "India's Nuclear brownout," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (November/December 1996), 16. 
85 Arnett notes that India operates four of the six poorest performing nuclear reactors 
and all nine of its monitored reactors are among the 50 least reliable in the world. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The emergence of post- cold war pressures provides strong motivations 
for India to abandon its nuclear weapons option. A bilateral nuclear 
denunciation agreement with Pakistan would foster Indian hegemony by 
maintaining India's significant conventional advantage. A unilateral Indian 
nuclear weapons denunciation would undermine militant factions in Pakistan and 
provide a olive branch for a potential long-lasting South Asian peace. The 
indefinite extension of the NPT and India's veto of the CTBT has left India as the 
sole significant standout against these globally supported measures. India's 
ambitious economic reforms requires a steady influx of foreign investment. 
India's civilian nuclear program contributes to a national energy shortage which 
undermines the global currency India seeks. 
Despite these arguments, Indian nuclear opponents pale in numbers and 
influence in comparison to nuclear advocates and ambiguity supporters. The 
lack of support for nuclear abstinence can be attributed to both calculated and 
coincidental factors. The government of rndia has prohibited an open 
parliamentary debate on the costs and benefits of its nuclear program. The 
1962 Atomic Energy Act broadly granted 
absolute powers to initiate, execute, propagate, and control 
exploration, planning and manufacturing of atomic material and its 
related hardware and all nuclear research and development 
activities to the sole authority of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC).86 
86 Ibid., 36. 
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This act allows the government to conceal the inefficiencies and dangers which 
perpetuate India's civilian nuclear program. The fact that Indians believe that 
nuclear energy is the answer instead of a contributing cause of the nation's 
economic problems is no accident. 87 
This chapter contends that emergence of post-cold war regional security, 
international, and economic realities creates substantial pressure on India to 
denounce its nuclear weapons option. Nevertheless, there is little support for 
nuclear abstinence. International agreements which Indians perceive as 
discriminatory, legitimizing the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states 
while subsequently restricting the capabilities of all others, have only 
strengthened India's stance against the NPT and CTBT. Additionally, the 
benefits of a nuclear free South Asia and India's subsequent conventional 
advantage over Pakistan are nullified by the existence of China's nuclear 
arsenal. 
Finally, the benefits of IAEA safeguards and international nuclear 
cooperation, and the costs of India's civilian nuclear program, are obscured by 
the propaganda efforts of India's nuclear bureaucracy. The Indian government 
falsely contends that nuclear weapons provide international prestige, regional 
security, and economic benefits. While this chapter demonstrates that emerging 
87 Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security 
Studies, volume 2, numbers 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993). 
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post-cold war pressures challenge the benefits of maintaining a nuclear option, 
the majority of Indian elites continue to hold on to nuclear aspirations. The 
ineffective nature of these pressures on India's nuclear posture make the future 
condition of Indian nuclear abstinence extremely improbable. The following 
contingent generalizations, however, may indicate that India will abandon its 
nuclear weapons option: 
*India's civilian nuclear power program contributes to a national energy crisis 
which significantly undermines foreign investment and economic growth. 
Currently Indian elites perceive that nuclear technology is the solution rather 
than the source of India's energy deficit. If lf!dian elites realize that India's 
energy shortage is caused by its inefficient nuclear power program, denunciation 
of the nuclear weapons option will become more likely. 
* Pakistan is India's most likely future adversary. Like India, Pakistan displays 
an ambiguous nuclear posture but, unlike India, has publicly stated that it is 
willing to consider arms control agreements. The Indo-Pakistani nuclear parity, 
which Pakistan currently enjoys, is not in India's security interest. If India 
perceives that Indo-Pakistani nuclear parity is in Pakistan's best interests, India 
will strive for a bilateral nuclear agreement denouncing nuclear weapons. 
* International arms control regimes, embodied by the NPT and CTBT are 
rejected by Indians are discriminatory. The NPT and CTBT fail to adequately 
address the global nuclear danger. If the world embraces time-bounded nuclear 
41 
disarmament negotiations, the possibility of Indian inclusion in the NPT becomes 
more likely. 
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Ill. DECLARATION AND DEPLOYMENT: THE 
OVERT NUCLEAR OPTION 
A. NUCLEAR ADVOCATES 
India possesses a nuclear weapons capability yet it has refrained from 
openly developing and deploying a nuclear arsenal. India is the only nation to 
test a nuclear device without developing an overt nuclear weapons posture. A 
significant minority of Indian elites say they believe, however, that India should 
abandon its nuclear restraint and declare and test a nuclear arsenal. 
88 These 
advocates argue that an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture undermines 
India's security, diminishes its position as a great power, and creates a 
dangerous strategic environment. 
This chapter examines the position of Indian nuclear advocates, and the 
four pressures which bear on the development of an overt nuclear weapons 
posture. The four pressures which might affect India's decision to "go nuclear'' 
are: (1) regional security concerns, which are fueled by increased suspicion over 
Pakistan's nuclear capabilities; (2) domestic political realties demonstrated by 
the rise in power of the Hindu nationalist BJP, and its uncompromising call for 
nuclear weapons; (3) international pressures illustrated by the belief of some 
Indians that India's long-standing rejection of the NPT and most recent standout 
against the CTBT will pressure Indian decisionmakers to develop and deploy 
nuclear weapons; and (4) economic costs can and must be overcome in India's 
quest for the security they associate with nuclear weapons. 
88 Thirty-three percent of Indian elites advocate the development and deployment of 
nuclear weapons. Cortright and Matteo, "Indian Public Opinion," 9. 
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B. REGIONAL SECURITY PRESSURES 
Many Indians view the overt deployment of nuclear weapons as vital to 
India's security. Brahma Chellaney, an Indian scholar and journalist, argues the 
realist position that nuclear weapons are a necessary tool in a dangerous world. 
He writes: 
Security interests demand that either India live in a world moving 
toward complete nuclear disarmament or it build nuclear 
weapons .... Without a credible nuclear deterrent, India has little 
protection from nuclear blackmail and danger such as occurred in 
the 1971 India-Pakistan war when President Richard Nixon 
considered using nuclear weapons to prevent Indian forces from 
decimating what was then West Pakistan. 89 
Chellaney's concerns are shared by many Indians including former Army 
Chief of Staff, General K.V. Krishna Rao: Rao has little faith in security 
assurances from nuclear powers. He doubts a nuclear state would risk 
intervention with its nuclear power to help a non-nuclear state. If India wishes to 
retain its sovereignty, India must develop its own nuclear weapon capability.90 
1. Ambiguous Equals Dangerous 
Some nuclear advocates claim that South Asia's current status of nuclear 
ambiguity is dangerous. An ambiguous n_uclear weapons posture increases the 
likelihood of Indo-Pakistani miscommunication and subsequent nuclear conflict. 
As opaque nuclear states, India and Pakistan have developed the capability to 
89 Brahma Chellaney quoted in Perkovich, "India's Nuclear Weapons Debate," 13, fn 
6. Chellaney is referring to the deployment of the USS Enterprise, a U.S. nuclear 
powered aircraft carrier, during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Some Indians inferred 
that the presence of U.S. naval power in the Bay of Bengal was an ambiguous 
nuclear threat. 
90 K.V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security (New Delhi: 
Lancer Publishers, 1991), 433. 
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produce nuclear weapons but have not developed a nuclear infrastructure. The 
presence of presumed nuclear weapons, without command and control 
mechanisms, is dangerous. 
Chief of Staff, General Sundarji, argues that these circumstances could 
lead to an accidental nuclear exchange: 
I believe that the continuance of an ambiguous nuclear policy from 
now on will be downright dangerous for two reasons. The first, due 
to the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan being 
triggered through miscalculation of each others' nuclear status, as 
well as ignorance of the nuclear doctrines that the two countries 
are likely to go by, which would culminate in a tragic nuclear 
exchange. The second, due to the difficulties of ensuring the 
prevention of unauthorized use when in a clandestine state. 91 
South Asian nuclear stability depends on bilateral development and deployment 
of nuclear weapons, which would provide both sides a comprehensive nuclear 
doctrine. 
U.S. strategic analyst, Gregory Giles, agrees with Sundarji on the dangers 
of undeclared nuclear arsenals. He argues that the secrecy and 
compartamentalism surrounding clandestine nuclear powers increases the 
chances for nuclear accidents. 92 Additionally, he notes that defacto nuclear 
states have failed to invest the essential amount of resources in safety and 
91 Gregory F. Giles, John H. Sandrock, Lewis A. Dunn, "Nuclear Weapons and 
Doctrine in India and Pakistan," (prepared for Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory by the Science Application International Corporation, 1993), 1-6, fn. 19. 
92 Gregory F. Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," Washington 
Quarterly (Spring 1993), 178. 
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security.·. He believes that regional crisis and domestic instability undermine the 
safety of defacto nuclear arsenals. 93 
2. Balance to Sino-Pakistani Alliance 
Recent Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation helps maintain the nuclear 
option as a cornerstone of India's strategy against both of its adversaries. 
Pakistan, however, remains the primary concern as recent Indo-Chinese 
relations ironically have improved. The United States and Indian suspect that 
China has assisted Pakistan in constructing a missile factory south of Islamabad. 
If true, China took this presumed course in spite of pressure from the United 
States. The U.S. accused China of violating the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), which China, although not a signatory, had agreed to uphold. 
On the other hand, some argue that China's actions and the Pakistani 
alliance help maintain a regional balance of power. For example, Patrick Tyler 
argues that China is assisting Pakistan's nuclear and missile program to balance 
Indian power on the subcontinent. Ironically, China pursues this policy and 
continues to improve its relations with India. 94 
China and Pakistan developed a cold war alliance which they maintained 
as a balance against India and Russia. As Russian power declines, however, 
increased Chinese-Pakistani cooperation has upset the Indian concept of 
93 Ibid., 184. 
94 Patrick E. Tyler, "China Raises Nuclear Stakes on the Subcontinent," New York 
Times 27 August 1996. 
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regional balance. Eden Woon, a former Pentagon specialist on China, 
describes the relationship between China and Pakistan. Woon writes, 
I don't think most people realize that China and Pakistan are 
strategic allies ... they are as close as the United States is to Britain 
and while China is trying hard to improve its relations with India, it 
always remembers that it once went to war with India. 95 
While Woon may be exaggerating the closeness of Chinese-Pakistani relations, 
his analogy captures the nature of South Asian strategic relations. China's 
recent assistance to Pakistan forges a path of eventual conflict with India. 
Further, enhanced Chinese-Pakistani military cooperation, especially in 
the arena of nuclear weapons, increases the urgency of India's nuclear decision. 
As Russian post-cold war power declines and Chinese power continues to rise, 
India feels more, rather than less, compelled to develop its own nuclear 
deterrent. 
C. POLITICAL PRESSURES 
Security pressures are only one indicator that India is serious about its 
nuclear option. Perhaps the strongest trend that supports a continued and 
possible expansion of India's nuclear weapons program is rooted in its current 
political environment. Defense analyst, Ram Subramanian, believes that India, 
with the tenth largest industrial capacity in the world, can enhance its 
international image by procuring a nuclear force. 96 
The April 1996 national elections demonstrated India's resolve to 
maintain its nuclear option, and the elections indicate that a stronger nuclear 
95 1bid. 
96 Ram R. Subramanian, Nuclear Competition in South Asia and U.S. Policy, 
(Institute of International Studies: University of California, Berkeley 1987 ), 44. 
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posture may develop in the near future. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) currently holds 160 of 543 parliamentary seats. As stated earlier, the 
BJP advocates a firm, pro-bomb platform. Former BJP President, Murli Manohar 
Joshi, has repeatedly advocated an overt nuclear weapons capability, 97 and 
briefly appointed Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, who denounced the 
"nuclear apartheid" of the NPT. Vajpayee stated, "For our own security, India 
should be well equipped. "98 The unsuccessful attempt of Vajpayee, however, to 
form a coalition government indicates that the Hindu nationalists have a way to 
go before mandating Indian policy. Nevertheless, the popularity of the BJP 
makes Indian global concessions on nuclear issues improbable. 
The United Front coalition government, led by Prime Minister Deve 
Gowda, recently has moved closer to the BJP's position. Its firm stance against 
the CTBT indicates that the United Front has no intentions on weakening India's 
nuclear position. In a possible effort to distinguish itself from the already 
hawkish stance of the Gowda administration, Mr. Brijesh Mishra, BJP foreign 
affairs activist, put forth a more extreme version of his party's platform. 
The party has categorically stated that India should go ahead with 
nuclear tests and the implication is that it should declare itself a 
nuclear power. The BJP has demanded that the Deve Gowda 
government should lose no time in- making a decision on this. 99 
97 Varun Sahni, "Going Nuclear: Establishing an Overt Nuclear Weapons Capability," 
in David Cortright and Amitabh Matteo, eds., India and the Bomb: Public Opinion 
and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 5. 
98 
"Potential Hindu Premier says India must be 'well-equipped'," International News 14 
May 1996. 
99 
"Conduct n-tests immediately: BJP," Hindu, 8 August 1996. 
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Additionally, the BJP stated "that any delay on this score would endanger 
national security."100 Thus, given the popularity of the BJP it is likely that the 
CTBT will remain off the table. 
D. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 
India has rejected the NPT and now the CTBT; yet, it adheres in part to its 
principles. India has neither proliferated its nuclear capabilities nor overtly 
developed its own nuclear weapons. Some feel that India's most recent 
rejection of the CTBT is consistent with its past behavior, and does not signal an 
upgrade in its own nuclear program. Others argue, however, that India's lone 
stance against the CTBT imposes a new era in India's nuclear program which 
could undermine the global nonproliferation effort. 
George Perkovich believes the CTBT is a moment of truth for Indian 
leadership. The CTBT, he argues will push India to abandon ambiguity and 
develop a clear nuclear weapons policy. 101 In addition he claims that isolating 
India as the sole CTBT holdout increases international pressure on India to test 
a nuclear device. 
Once (the) CTBT comes into being in one form or another, India 
will stand out in the eyes of the world, whether in good light or bad, 
just as it has stood out at Geneva for stoutly defending its long-
hold position. Either it will be seen as a country which gave in at 
the end, or as one which must be really seriously intending to 
exercise its nuclear option, which otherwise it would not have 
defended so stubbornly against such heavy odds. 102 
100 Ibid. 
101 1bid., 11. 
102 Pran Chopra, "Gaps in India's n-policy," Hindu 28 June 1996. 
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Praful Bidwai, former Senior Editor of the Times of India, agreed that 
India's veto of the CTBT enhances the possibility of an overt nuclear weapons 
posture. Bidwai argues: 
An Indian refusal to sign a CTBT makes little sense unless India 
goes on to defy the CTBT regime in some way. If India were 
simply to refuse to sign the treaty but remain in the same pre-
signing position of threshold ambiguity, then all it would do is to 
incur the costs of such a refusal, but without its supposed benefits. 
That is why the CTBT debate over the last two years in India has 
also been marked by a more intensified discussion than before 
over two forms which a possible Indian defiance of a CTBT regime 
could take: one, a test explosion or a series of them; and two, open 
weaponisation. 103 
Nuclear advocates benefit from the political fallout of the international 
arms control regime. As a proud, yet underdeveloped state, India gains a sense 
of power by its stance against the NPT and recent veto of the CTBT. 
Ambassador Ghose exclaimed to the Indian press after she vetoed the CTBT: 
"Now for all those who said where the hell is India, they know where India is."104 
India's exuberance at standing up to the developed world is typical of formerly 
colonized nations. Clifford Geertz argue~ that the power imbalances between 
the colonizers and the new states has brought about "nationalist sensitivity to 
103 Ibid. 
104 Raj Chengappa, "Playing the Spoiler," India Today, 15 September 1996, 76. 
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outside interference" which is aptly demonstrated by India's hard stance against 
the international arms control regime. 105 
E. ECONOMIC PRESSURES 
Nuclear advocates maintain an optimistic perspective, which claims that 
India can overcome the high costs associated with nuclear weapons. This is a 
result of the Department of Energy's claims that promote the economic benefits 
of nuclear technology and the contention that India must develop an economy 
less vulnerable to foreign influence. While many nuclear advocates understand 
the high costs of an Indian weapons program, they contend that India can and 
must meet this economic challenge in order to maintain its national sovereignty. 
India possesses a highly invested, yet poorly developed nuclear 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, some argue that India's nuclear infrastructure will 
help subsidize the costs of a fully deployed nuclear program. Brigadier General 
Vijai Nair, a nuclear advocate, believes that India's extensive civilian nuclear 
power program, which can produce fissile material, help supplement the costs of 
a weapons program. 106 
Despite his optimistic assertion, Nair understands that going nuclear is a 
major undertaking which demands significant Indian effort. Going nuclear would 
place demands on every facet of the Indian economy including the: 
development of a national command structure; enlightenment of 
the leadership; viable military capabilities; intricate control, 
surveillance and targeting systems; real time data links integrated 
105 Clifford Geertz, "After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States," 
in his, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz (New York: 
1973), 237. 
106 Vijai K. Nair, Nuclear India (London: Lancer International, 1992), 200. 
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into imperishable communication systems; a broad based civil 
defense structure; primary alerting systems; radiation detection 
grids and early warning broadcasting facilities; decontamination 
and specialist medical facilities; environmental control 
organizations and a host of other allied issues.107 
Another military nuclear advocate, General Krishna Rao, has a strategic 
vision which includes a strong economy as a vital element of national security. 
His vision of the economy is in the Indian tradition of self-reliance. India must 
avoid reliance on foreign investment least it become vulnerable to foreign 
interference. 108 
Additionally, Rao understands that India's high rate of population growth 
may undermine national security: "It has to be ensured that population growth is 
kept under certain acceptable limits, to ensure that the benefits of development 
are not diluted. "109 Despite the looming concerns of unchecked population 
growth and poverty, he maintains that economic growth and nuclear weapons 
can coexist. He argues, 
while a large percentage of the population lives under the poverty 
line, India can release funds for a nuclear program without creating 
unacceptable imbalances provided the program is phased and 
prioritized pragmatically. 110 
107 Ibid., 2-3. 
108 K.V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security, (New Delhi: 
Lancer Publishers, 1991),492. 
109 Ibid., 393. 
110 Nair, Nuclear India. 6. 
52 
Chapter II argues that Indian economic reforms of de-centralization and 
foreign investment make it vulnerable to international economic sanctions. 
There is evidence that while Indian leaders cannot openly declare concerns 
about international pressure, they take the threat of economic isolation seriously. 
Shortly after the Geneva Convention Indian veto of the CTBT, Finance Minister, 
P. Chidambaram, claimed that India's economy would not be adversely affected 
by its stand. He stated "in my assessment, there will be no fallout in the 
economic field on lndia."111 Indian trade experts claim that investment 
opportunities in India's infrastructure are so attractive that foreign and multi-
lateral corporations will be encouraged to invest in India despite the reservations 
of their governments. 
The United States helped diminish Indian fears of economic isolation by 
promising that economic sanctions would not develop as a fallout of the Geneva 
Conference. 112 The U.S. guarantee of non-sanctions was made by U.S. 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in a letter written to persuade India not 
to block a UN vote. Christopher's letter stated, 
You state your objections to the text in as harsh a manner as you 
feel appropriate. Do not sign it, if you feel your national concerns 
are not served that way. But do not block its transmission to the 
UN. At no stage in the future, would you be subjected to coercion 
because of your non-ratification. 113 
111 Hindu, 26 August 1996, 01 col.a. 
112 Ibid. 
113 K.K. Katyal, "Warren Christopher's Letter to Gujral: No Coercion on CTBT, US," 
Hindu, 9 August 1996. 
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India's confidence on this issue follows a rationale that the world is 
hesitant to utilize economic sanctions except under dire circumstance. The U.S. 
reluctance to sanction China for Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
violations, and for suspected Chinese-Pakistani construction of a missile factory 
south of Islamabad make economic sanctions of India remote. Additionally, 
Turkey and France have resumed trade agreements with Iran against U.S. 
desires. India, however, must not mistake the lack of international economic 
sanctions against the Indian position on the CTBT as a signal that it can test a 
weapon without penalties. 
India has attempted to deflect some of its economic fears by highlighting 
its economic ties to Russia. Although India faces an allied coalition from the 
West and China, its fears of isolation are somewhat relieved by its traditionally 
strong ties to Russia. Russia has joined the world in requesting Indian inclusion 
in the CTBT. Indo-Russian relations, however, will not be affected negatively by 
India's decision. Russian officials stated, "We are clear that the recent 
expression of the Russian position on the CTBT is in no way meant to pressure 
India and will not affect ties on the bilateral track."114 
India correctly perceives that a growing economy will help protect it from 
global economic pressures. The United States has attempted several coercive 
economic measures to influence Chinese policies with limited success. Some 
114 Atoll Anemia, "CTBT Row Unlikely to Hit Ties with Russia," Hindu, 7 April 1996. 
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Indians understand that it will be free from similar tactics only when it develops 
the economic muscle of a rapid growing economy. 
the best insurance for India against any possible pressure on the 
economic front would be to notch up successively high economic 
growth rates and create conditions for expanding trade and 
investment.115 
India can feel certain that its ambiguous nuclear posture, and its opposition to 
the CTBT, will cause very little economic fallout. The testing or deployment of 
nuclear weapons, however, may incite a very different reaction, one that India 
must understand. 116 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines the growing pressures on India's nuclear posture. 
India's nuclear organization continues to apply bureaucratic pressure as elected 
officials make more vocal cries for nuclear clarity. Sino-Pakistani nuclear 
cooperation helps maintain India's nuclear option as the cornerstone of its 
regional strategy. While many nuclear advocates realize the costs of nuclear 
weapons, they contend that an independent growing economy will protect India 
from foreign pressure. Despite these demands on its nuclear posture, most 
Indian elites favor the current posture of ambiguity and India's nuclear posture 
will probably not change dramatically. 
115 Hindu, 26 August 1996, 01 col. a. 
116 A former member of the Indian Defense Ministry conceded that while Indian 
leaders are politically constrained from openly acknowledging its fears of economic 
sanctions, in private, "They must be thinking about it." Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory Conference on South Asia. September, 1996. 
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A change in one or more of the pressures, however, can alert outside 
policy makers of a potential variation in India's nuclear policy. The following 
contingent generalizations could indicate an Indian overt nuclear weapons 
posture. 
*The right wing BJP has long advocated an overt Indian nuclear posture. Its 
election manifesto called for the rapid development of nuclear weapons. If the 
BJP comes to power, with a clear majority, an overt nuclear weapons posture 
becomes more likely. 
*The maintenance of the Sino-Indian border agreement is essential to lasting 
peace between India and China. If there is a re-militarization of the Sino-Indian 
border, an overt nuclear weapons posture becomes much more likely. 
* India's growing participation in the global economy makes it vulnerable to 
international economic and diplomatic pressures. Most Indians perceive internal 
problems of poverty and ethnic violence as the biggest threat to national 
security. Fiscal restraints make an overt nuclear weapons posture too 
expensive. A rapidly growing Indian economy, however, may encourage Indian 
policy makers to invest more resources in defense. If India's economy rapidly 
improves, with several years of sustained economic growth, an overt nuclear 
weapons posture becomes more likely. 
* India's nuclear posture is directed primarily towards Pakistan. Traditional Indo-
Pakistani competition requires India to remain "ahead" of their advisory. If 
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IV. MAINTAINING NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY 
India deliberately has chosen an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture by 
acknowledging it possesses the technology for making a nuclear bomb and yet 
refraining from developing and deploying nuclear weapons. India believes this 
policy successfully deters potential adversaries who are fearfully uncertain of 
India's nuclear capability, while at the same time the policy saves India from 
participating in a dangerous and expensive arms race. Even though most Indian 
elites feel that the ambiguous nuclear posture "reflects a prudent mix of idealism 
and pragmatism,"117 this policy is under attack from domestic and international 
elements. 
A. AMBIGUITY: RESISTING PRESSURES 
India faces new security, political, international, and economic challenges 
in the post-cold war. Regional security concerns and domestic political 
movements pressure Indian decisionmakers to develop and deploy nuclear 
weapons, while international and economic pressures call for India to renounce 
its nuclear weapons option. 
This chapter argues that India's current nuclear weapons policy (neither 
renouncing nor developing nuclear weapons) will survive these emerging 
pressures. It demonstrates that India's ambiguous nuclear posture is a strategic 
decision which will endure the test of the post-cold war environment. While the 
post-cold war environment has encouraged the vocalization of both advocates 
and opponents to India's nuclear posture, India's nuclear weapons decision 
117 Fifty-nine percent of Indian elites support their government's policy of nuclear 
ambiguity. Cortright and Mattoo, "Indian Public Opinion," 3. 
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making process has not changed and will not bE 3ltered by its critics. India's 
ambiguous nuclear weapons posture will endure the pressures of the post-cold 
war. 
B. SECURITY PRESSURES 
The Soviet Union was India's staunch cold war ally. The 1971 Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation provided 
that in the event of an attack or threat of attack on either party they 
would enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such 
threat and take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace 
and security of their countries. 118 
This Indo-Soviet relationship was directed primarily against China. The Soviet 
Union provided India with significant military and economic assistance.119 Wang 
Hongyu, a senior fellow in the Shanghai Center for South Asian Studies, notes 
that the end of the cold war has given way to improved Sino-Indian relations. 
Improved relations between India and China is in the interests of both 
nations. Increased economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation strengthens 
India's and China's status in the world. Pairing these enormous markets and 
growing economies provides both nations with diplomatic leverage. 120 An Indian 
overt nuclear posture, however, could unqermine the recently fostered Chinese 
relationship. India's security interests are best served when its nuclear posture 
118 V. D. Chopra, Indo-Soviet Relations: Prospects and Problems (New Delhi: Patriot 
Publishers, 1991), 153. 
119 Wang Hongyu, "Sino-Indian Relations: Present and Future," Asian Survey 25, no.6 (June 1995), 548. 
120 Ibid., 549. 
60 
is perceived as a balance against weaker Pakistan rather than China. India's 
ambiguous posture does not threaten China. An overt nuclear posture that 
includes the deployment of nuclear-capable long range Agni missiles, however, 
could threaten China and undermine Indo-Chinese relations. P.R. Chari 
acknowledges that India's missile program "is designed to meet the nuclear 
threat from China and establish credible deterrent capabilities for this 
purpose."121 The importance of Indo-Chinese relations, however, encourages 
India to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons aimed at China. 
Early Indian nuclear planners focused India's nuclear development on a 
potential threat from China. India's nuclear weapons capability would contribute 
if necessary to a larger global conflict involving both the Soviet Union, China, 
and the United States. The end of the cold war and emergence of a Pakistani 
nuclear capability, however, has made Pakistan's capability the prime impetus 
for India's nuclear posture. Table 4-1 demonstrates the relative importance of 
the perceived Pakistani threats over perceived threats from China. 122 
Why India Should Develop Nuclear Weapons? 
Threats from nuclear Pakistan 57% 
Threats from other nuclear powers 27% 
Threats from China 20% 
Table 4-1 
121 Chari, "Indian Defense and Security," 91. 
122 Cortright and Mattoo, "Indian Public Opinion." 
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When Indian elites were questioned on their opinions of the use of 
nuclear weapons, Pakistan, not China, emerged as the focal point of India's 
nuclear decision in table 4-2. 123 
When Could India Use Nuclear Weapons? 
If Pakistan were about to take over Kashmir 33% 
If China were about to overwhelm India 23% 
militarily 
Table 4-2 
George Perkovich argues that an overt nuclear weapons posture would 
threaten Indo-Chinese accord and undermine Indian security. While an 
ambiguous nuclear weapons posture is directed primarily towards Pakistan, the 
deployment of nuclear weapons would be perceived as a threat against the 
Chinese. India does not have the economic resources to quickly produce a 
nuclear arsenal on par with China's nuclear force. 124 An Indian overt nuclear 
123 Fifty-nine percent of Indian elites support their government's policy of nuclear 
ambiguity. Cortright and Mattoo, "Indian Public Opinion," 3. 
124 Perkovich argues that it would take decades for India to build a "secure, 
survivable, minimal deterrent" towards China. 
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posture would generate a Sino-Indian nuclear arms race; a race it which India is 
already way behind. Perkovich concludes that: 
the decision to deploy a (Indian) nuclear arsenal, therefore, could 
decrease rather than increase Indian security for generations to 
come. 125 
Kanti Bajpai, an opponent of Indian nuclear weapons, shares this view with 
Perkovich. An ambiguous nuclear posture, Bajpai argues, will undermine Indian 
security by making it a future target of every nuclear power. Bajpai suspects that 
China may already target India from missile sites in Tibet. U.S. and Russian 
targeting of India would become more likely if clarity replaces ambiguity. Bajpai 
believes that an overt nuclear weapons posture would make India the target of 
every nuclear power including China. 126 While this has little military impact (the 
targeting of strategic targets takes minutes), it has a psychological impact. The 
United States and Russia frequently remind their respective publics that they no 
longer have nuclear weapons pointing at them in order to increase security 
perceptions. Bajpai argues, 
Nuclear ambiguity may deter an equally ambiguous Pakistan, even 
China, but it may also expose India to several further layers of 
nuclear threat, thereby greatly increasing its strategic risk. 127 
125 George Perkovich, "After The CTBT: Now Come the Hard Choices for India," 
Henry L. Stimson Center South Asian Security Series 9 October 1996. 
126 Kanti Bajpai, "Secure Without The Bomb," Seminar 444 (August 1996), 58. 
127 Ibid. 
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Recent improvements in Sino-Indian relations make the evolution of an 
overt Indian posture improbable. While India and China still have a long-
standing border dispute, in 1993 both sides agreed to settle the issue without 
military force. The Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along 
Sino-Indian Border Areas stipulates: 
that border issues should be settled through peaceful and friendly 
negotiations, that neither side should use force or threaten to use 
force against the other, that the two side should strictly respect and 
observe the line of actual control and keep military forces in the 
area to a minimum.128 
The maintenance of this agreement and enhancing Indo-Chinese relations takes 
precedent over the nuclear issue. Indians understand they have to choose 
between military competition or economic cooperation with Beijing. India should 
seek prestige and power on the economic, social, diplomatic and political 
arenas. The increasing power and status of Germany and Japan should serve 
as an example to India. Indian competition with the Chinese "is civic and 
economic, not military and nuclear."129 Given its national interest in a growing 
economy, India will continue to pursue peaceful engagement rather than risk 
military confrontation with the Chinese. -
128 Hongyu, "Sino-Indian Relations," 548. 
129 Bajpai, "Secure Without The Bomb," 58. 
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C. POLITICAL PRESSURES 
The fall of the Congress party and rise of the BJP were ultimately 
replaced by the United Front Coalition. While the BJP gained the largest 
percentage of parliamentary seats in the national elections in the spring of 1996, 
it was unable to convince other political parties to join it in forming a coalition. 
Its radical positions alienated both centrist and leftist parties. The result? The 
BJP government lasted less than one month and was replaced by a moderate 
United Front Government. 
Presently, the parties making up the United Front Government have few 
political interests in common and are loosely organized around five separate 
parties. 130 Its policies are driven from interests from the left as well as the long-
standing Congress Party. Its mandate, if any, is generated by a lack of trust in 
the corruption-ridden Congress Party, and a fear of radical rule by the BJP. The 
precarious nature of the United Front Government,131 makes it improbable that it 
will make any new or radical foreign policy changes. 
Thus, although nuclear advocates may be gaining influence through the 
BJP, there is no guarantee of a future overt Indian nuclear weapons posture. 
The uncertainty surrounding the attempt of the United Front to form a coalition 
130 lnderjit Badhwar describes the balancing act of the Deve Gowda government in 
"United Front: Pitfalls and Problems," India Today, 30 June 1996. 
131 Only nine percent of voters predicted that the UF would last a full term. "BJP 
Gaining More," India Today, 30 June 1996. 
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indicates that current nuclear posture will probably not change under this 
administration. Raja Mohan points out that political instability makes it less likely 
that Indian leaders will be restrained by foreign nonproliferation advocates. 
The great powers may find it impossible to wring concessions from 
New Delhi on such issues as nuclear policy and Kashmir given the 
current political instability in India and the reluctance of any weak 
government to be seen as yielding to outside pressures. In short, 
India can transform its domestic political weakness into foreign 
policy strength. 132 
This argument corresponds with the negotiation concept that it is difficult 
to obtain concessions from a divided democracy. Fred lkle, a expert in 
negotiation and diplomacy, argues that domestic instability constrains 
international negotiators which "can lead to greater initial demands and more 
rigid commitments than if a party were all of one mind. "133 
Despite this constraint, Mohan suspects that Indian diplomats have 
agreed secretly to curtail India's nuclear weapons program. 
There is considerable suspicion in the country, despite the denials 
of the Indian Government, that its leaders may have given 
commitments not to cross certain lines on the nuclear and missile 
programs. 134 
This suspicion, that Indian policy makers are secretly restrained by the 
international community, has not yet been validated. 
132 Raja Mohan, "Perils of the Back Channel," Hindu 30 May 1996, 12, col. c. 
133 Fred C. lkle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987) . 
134 Mohan, "Perils of the Back Channel," 12, col. c. 
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D. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 
The indefinite extension of the NPT strengthens India's determination to 
maintain a nuclear weapons option. India's long term goal of global nuclear 
disarmament insists that India maintain an ambiguous nuclear posture in 
defiance of the NPT. Both nuclear denunciation and an overt nuclear posture 
would undermine India's global disarmament strategy. India's objection to the 
NPT and CTBT is that it legitimizes the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. To India 
the NPT and CTBT imply that the possession of nuclear weapons is permissible 
so long as no nuclear tests are conducted and no new nations develop nuclear 
weapons. This is unacceptable to India. 
While many nations see the NPT as "a political commitment to refrain 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, "135 India perceives the treaty to be an attempt 
of nuclear weapons states to legitimize their own weapons. Although the NPT 
was extended indefinitely, the non-inclusion of nuclear capable India, 
undermines its efficacy. 
I.K. Gujral, the United Front's new External Affairs Minister, reiterated 
India's commitment to maintaining the weaponization option until all nations 
agree to abolish their nuclear arsenals: 
My national security demands that_! reserve our nuclear options. 
We will not sign unless I am satisfied that if I give up my option the 
rest would follow. What we have been trying to do is to make the 
blessed treaty (CTBT) credible. We want to give it some flesh, 
some teeth so that we really eliminate nuclear weapons. 136 
(emphasis added) 
135 Kathleen C. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1993), 3. 
136 Raj Chengappa, "I'll Give More than I Take: Interview with I.K. Gujral," India Today, 
30 June 1996, 39. 
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E. ECONOMIC PRESSURES 
Chapter II argues that maintaining a nuclear option has undermined the 
Indian economy. It contends that India's civilian nuclear program has 
contributed to a energy crisis which threatens foreign investment and financing 
in infrastructure. Most Indians elites, however, do not agree with this 
assessment, as seen in table 4-3. 137 
Opinions About Civilian Nuclear Energy Program 
Civilian nuclear energy program can help meet India's nuclear energy 87% 
deficit. 
The benefits of a civilian nuclear ener 
A civilian nuclear energy program can be more harmful than 
beneficial. 





Despite optimistic claims about the benefits of the civilian nuclear program, 
many experts have argued that the economic costs associated with weapons 
production will restrain India's nuclear posture. 
George Perkovich noted in a recent luncheon discussion at the Stimson 
Center that an Indian overt nuclear weapons posture would be too expensive for 
the Indian economy. Increases in intelligence, warning, and command and 
137 Cortright and Matteo, "Indian Public Opinion," table 6. 
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control systems would require major budgetary increases. He argues, "were 
India to deploy nuclear weapons, the direct and indirect costs borne by everyday 
Indians would skyrocket."138 Given India's concern of maintaining high economic 
growth rates, an overt deployment of nuclear weapons is unlikely. 
The recently elected United Front Government has declared "a seven 
percent annual growth rate in GDP to be a strategic priority for India." Perkovich 
argues that the nuclear weapons production would exacerbate India's fiscal 
deficit, which and undermine economic growth. 139
 He notes: 
India's prime ministers have historically been very sensitive to the 
economic costs of further advances in their nuclear program. This 
sensitivity, in turn, helps account for India's significant restraint in 
this field. It would be difficult to imagine how any Indian 
government could benefit politically from the diversion of resources 
away from economic development and social welfare programs to 
greater spending on nuclear weapons. 140 
India has hinted that its recent decline in conventional military capability 
may tempt decisionmakers to consider the nuclear option as a method of 
increasing military power at lower costs. A recent Indian finance report 
demonstrates the weakness and ineffective nature of India's conventional forces. 
Traditionally, India has planned its defense on a hardware and modernization 
project. India's defense spending is characterized by a quest for the latest and 




best technology. While high technology programs, such as aircraft carriers and 
nuclear propelled submarines may not satisfy any of India's strategic concerns, 
the latest technology pacifies Indian desires to maintain technological parity with 
the west. Defense officials now, however, recognize the process of hardware 
acquisition, notwithstanding strategic requirements, as self defeating. 141 
Indian defense officials recognize the ineffective nature of hardware 
acquisition without linking equipment to strategies. A recent Indian Finance 
Ministry Report criticized the three services for concentrating more on capital 
intensive military hardware, such as aircraft and ships, while failing to budget for 
a number of priority areas such as force-multipliers, sensors, logistic support, 
missiles and communication support. 142 While this report fails to mention the 
nuclear weapons question, it focuses the procurement process away from 
hardware acquisition to a strategically based defense program. "A clear national 
security policy has to be formulated, defining the country's goals and the role 
India should play in the region. "143 
Another Indian government report contends that nuclear weapons may be 
the result of shrinking military budgets and capabilities. The Institute of Defense 
Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, recommends that India's conventional forces 
141 Former financial adviser at the Defense Ministry, Amiya Ghosh, claims that India 
needs to better match its defense spending with its strategic requirements. Vivek 
Raghuvanshi, "Finance Report Faults Government For India's Severe Defense 
Decline," Defense News (October 14-20, 1996),98. 
·
142 Ibid., 98. 
143 Avirook Sen, "Casualties of Funds Crunch," India Today, 15 October 1996, p. 92. 
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receive a minimum annual investment of three percent of the GDP. Anything 
less than 2.5 percent would undermine the credibility of India's conventional 
forces and require the deployment of nuclear capability. 144 This 
recommendation assumes that India utilize nuclear weapons to bolster its 
military power with less resources. 
Perkovich is skeptical of potential conventional arms savings created by 
the deployment of nuclear weapons. He believes cuts in conventional forces are 
improbable. The security threats facing India internal. India faces a host of 
ethnic disturbances, border skirmishes, and problems in Kashmir. Nuclear 
weapons cannot abate these internal security threats. 145 General Sundarji, a 
nuclear advocate, agrees that India's primary threats are internal. He asserts 
that political opportunism inciting conflict among India's ethnically and religiously 
diverse population "creates doubt about India's prospects and ability to retain its 
unity amid its diversity. "146 
144 Ibid. 
145 Perkovich, "After The CTBT." 
146 General K Sundarji, "Internal Threats to India," Hindu, 5 November 1996, . 
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Indian fears of the growing challenge of internal rather than external 
threats is further validated by Brahma Chellaney. He believes, 
The most prominent domestic development is the growing 
internalization of security threats. The escalating ethnic, sectarian, 
and regional unrest in the country will increasingly force Indian 
Security planners to look inward. 147 
A growing economy and strong police force will be India's tools to combat 
its internal threats. The emergence of threats from within the state diverts 
resources away from strategic forces designed to combat an external threat. 
The rise in ethnic and religious conflict will preoccupy Indian decisionmakers in 
the near future. Indian concentration on internal threats averts attention from a 
potential overt nuclear weapons posture thereby strengthening Indian nuclear 
restraint. 
F. RESTRAINING EFFECTS OF THE U.S. - INDIAN ACCORD 
The end of the cold war provided a fresh start for U.S.-Indian relations. 
The ideological differences have been eliminated and many Indians hope that 
the United States and India can forge stronger relations based on mutual 
respect. 148 Chellaney argues that improving ties with the United States helps 
147 Brahma Chellaney, "India," in Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries 
Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 1995) 169. 
148 India's External Affairs Minister stated he hoped that a new relationship with the 
United States could develop based on mutual respect. Quoted in Chengappa, "I'll 
Give More Than I'll Take," 39. 
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restrain India's nuclear program. "The warming ties with the United States make 
it harder for India to ignore Western pressure and chart a confrontational path 
toward nuclear weaponization."149 He warns, however, that overt U.S. pressures 
on an Indian decision could backfire, "since such pressure could inflame Indian 
nationalist movements."150 
India's growing dependence on foreign investment and trade has not 
persuaded India to forgo its nuclear option. Chapter II demonstrates that while 
India is sensitive to economic sanctions, it will not be blackmailed into 
renouncing its nuclear weapons option. India's active participation in the global 
economy, however, does appear to be restraining any overt nuclear ambitions. 
Chellaney argues that, 
India's severe economic constraints are unlikely to go away soon. 
Indeed, they have bred external constraints on any India move to 
weaponize. Recourse to multilateral institutional borrowing has 
brought sustained pressure on India for military restraint and 
regional arms control. India's radical economic reforms need the 
support of Western capital and technology if they are to succeed. 
This need, as well as New Delhi's credit dependence on 
Washington-based multilateral institution, has given the United 
States some political leverage over lndia. 151 
This argument seems to validate the warnings of cold war economic nationalist, 
Subramanian Swamy. He admonished foreign investment and called for self-
149 Chellaney, "India," 175. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid., 174-75. 
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reliance. 152 Indians must now acknowledge that their new interdependence with 
the global economy has given leverage to international arms control efforts. 
While this leverage has been thus far unsuccessful at "rolling back" India's 
nuclear weapons capabilities it clearly contributes to Indian restraint. 
G. SUMMARY 
The emerging security, political, international, and economic pressures 
strengthen India's current policy of nuclear ambiguity. The 1993 Sino-Indian 
accord "agreeing to disagree" without military force was an important Indian 
strategic accomplishment. An overt nuclear weapons posture, coupled with 
intermediate range missiles, could threaten Beijing and the recent improvements 
in Sino-Indian relations. 
The indefinite extension of the NPT has legitimized the nuclear arsenals 
of the five nuclear weapons states. This discriminatory agreement is 
unacceptable to Indians who demand global nuclear disarmament. India will 
remain a holdout to the NPT until the NPT addresses India's desire of a nuclear 
free world. The recent parliamentary victories of the Hindu Nationalist BJP has 
vitalized the center of Indian politics. Fearful of right wing BJP control, the left 
and moderates of the Congress Party are willing to compromise in order to keep 
the BJP and its nuclear aspirations at bay. 
152 Subramarian Swamy, Indian Economic Planning: An Alternative Approach (New 
York: Barnes & Noble 1971). 
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The post-cold war economic reforms have placed fiscal constraints on 
India's defense and nuclear aspirations. Now more than ever, national 
decisionmakers will concentrate on industrial and infrastructure requirements in 
order to build domestic stability. An overt nuclear weapons posture, in the 
current absence of external threats to national security, will not be achieved. 
While this chapter concludes that nuclear ambiguity will continue to be 
India's most likely nuclear policy, there remains domestic and international 
pressures which could erode India's nuclear posture. The following contingent 
generalizations, however, could help stabilize India's ambiguous nuclear 
posture. 
*The Congress Party has dominated India politics for over fifty years. Most 
Indians believe that the recently elected United Front Coalition will not survive a 
full term. The next national election may determine the future of India's nuclear 
policy. If the Congress Party returns to power India's ambiguous nuclear 
posture will stabilize. 
* From India's perspective, the indefinite extension of the NPT, is a step 
backward for global nuclear disarmament. In India's view, the non-nuclear 
members have accepted the everlasting presence of nuclear weapons within the 
nuclear weapons states. If the NPT continues to be unchallenged boy other 





Given current security, political, international, and economic pressures, 
India will continue to maintain an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture for the 
foreseeable future. This conclusion, however, depends on the current 
conditions prevailing over the next five years. 153 A major change in any one of 
the conditions addressed in this thesis could alter India's nuclear weapons 
posture. Changes in the current conditions suggest likely directions for the 
future of India's nuclear weapons posture. 
A. INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DENUNCIATION IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY 
Finding: Unless the Nuclear Weapons States embrace global 
nuclear disarmament, international arms control regimes will continue to 
be ineffective in convincing India to abandon its nuclear option. The 
indefinite extension of the NPT and India's veto of the CTBT has mobilized 
nuclear opponents, ambiguity supporters, and nuclear advocates against an 
international arms control regime they perceive as discriminatory. 
Implication: New U.S. approaches to the India's nuclear posture 
need to be developed. Nonproliferation advocates should focus their attention 
on arms control and confidence building measures between India and Pakistan 
instead of international agreements which India soundly rejects. Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, suggests that the United States use its 
substantial intelligence capability to reduce South Asian nuclear tensions. 154 
153 The United Front's term is scheduled to end in 2002. It would be unwise to 
speculate the future of India's nuclear weapons posture beyond that date. 
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These technically-driven confidence-building measures could reduce the risk of 
a nuclear exchange. 
A January 1995 Speech, given by U.S. Secretary of Defense William 
Perry, to the Foreign Policy Association demonstrates that the current 
administration seeks the cooperative engagement this thesis recommends. 
Perry said, 
We find India and Pakistan's position on nuclear proliferation 
unpalatable. But to use this as a reason to disengage from the 
region, or to avoid deepening our security ties with these nations, 
could undermine efforts to cap their destructive capability. It could 
help push them into an unfettered arms race that would be 
disastrous. I believe that we can best help to avoid the disastrous 
by building bridges of trust between the United States and lndia. 155 
Finding: While India's civilian nuclear power program has 
contributed to a national energy crisis which undermines the Indian 
economy, most Indians believe that nuclear power will help solve India's 
energy crisis. 
While investment in India's nuclear power program has decreased over 
the past five years, 156 India continues to invest a disproportionate amount of 
resources on nuclear energy. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission expends 
the majority of all energy production R&D resources; yet only provides three 
154 Robert B. Oakley and Jed C. Snyder, "Escalating Tensions in South Asia," 
Strategic Forum 71. no.4 (April 1996), 4. 
155 Secretary of Defense William Perry speaking to the Foreign Policy Association, 
January 31, 1995, New York, New York. 
156 The Indian government has cut the budget for the Atomic Energy Commission 
seventy percent in constant dollars since in 1988. Eric Arnett, "India's Nuclear 
Brownout," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (November/December 1996), 15. 
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percent of the current energy demand. India's nuclear power reactors are some 
of the worst in the world and India's refusal to except IAEA safeguards on its 
nuclear program contributes to the inefficiencies of the industry. 
The IAEC's woeful record, however, seems to go unnoticed by the 
majority of elites who believe that nuclear power is a potential solution rather 
than a cause of India's energy shortage. 
Implication: Nonproliferation advocates should attempt to link 
economic benefits with nuclear weapons denunciation. When Indian elites 
and businessmen perceive that their nuclear program undermines the economy, 
they will begin to pressure national decisionmakers to abandon India's nuclear 
option. 
Finding: The rising political power of nuclear advocates 
represented by the BJP prevents any serious discussion of abandoning 
the nuclear option. While the nuclear aspirations of the BJP who demand an 
immediate overt nuclear weapons posture will most likely be unrealized, their 
surge in political power prevents national leaders from seriously entertaining 
denunciation. 
Implication: The BJP is a significant political party and not a fringe 
group. Any international denunciation of the Hindu nationalists would 
most likely catalyze their supporters. The United States should continue to 
refrain from any involvement in Indian politics. Any U.S. overt support for a 
moderate Indian political group would only undermine their credibility. 
Finding: Concerns about a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability 
compel India to keep the nuclear weapons option open. While Pakistan has 
announced publicly that it would consider a bilateral nuclear weapons 
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denunciation agreement with India, there will always be the possibility of a future 
nuclear weapons capability in Pakistan. This possibility will compel India to 
keep its nuclear weapons option alive. Recent covert nuclear weapons 
programs by Iraq and North Korea demonstrate the precarious nature of 
international arms control regimes. As signatories to the NPT, Iraq and North 
Korea were still capable of developing significant covert nuclear weapons 
programs. While the potential nuclear weapons programs of these rouge states 
has been temporarily averted, their existence undermines the credibility of 
international arms control regimes. Many Indians must fear that Pakistan's 
nuclear capability may never "be put back in the bottle." 
Implication: Nonproliferation advocates should continue to 
encourage Pakistani nuclear weapons restraint. India's and Pakistan's 
nuclear weapons postures are inseparable linked. Nonproliferation advocates 
must address the South Asian nuclear problem by dealing with both defacto 
nuclear arsenals. 
B. INDIA WILL CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM AN OVERT NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS POSTURE 
Finding: Improving Sino-Indian _relations help to restrain an overt 
nuclear weapons option. The recent Sino-Indian reduction in border hostilities 
is a sound diplomatic solution for India. As India continues to engage in the 
global economy, relations with economic superpower China is paramount. Any 
provocative Indian gesture could upset contemporary Indo-Chinese detente, 
undermining India's economic aspirations. An ambiguous nuclear weapons 
posture adequately serves India's security interests with China. India will 
continue to refrain from an overt nuclear weapons declaration. 
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Implication: The United States should encourage Sino-Indian 
accord. The U.S. should utilize its improving relationship with India and China 
to encourage a final border solution. 
Finding: Despite the rise of the BJP, there is not an overwhelming 
political movement for overt nuclear weapons declaration. While the BJP 
has captured the largest percentage of parliamentary seats, it is unable to form a 
majority coalition. The formation of the United Front demonstrates that Indian 
political parties are willing to compromise to contain the aspirations of the right 
wing BJP. While the BJP has developed the largest single political party in 
India, the majority of Indians reject the agenda of the Hindu nationalists. 
Additionally, it is not certain that, given an opportunity, the BJP would 
carry through their nuclear aspirations. When given the opportunity of 
leadership, the BJP demonstrated a more moderate stance than demonstrated in 
their minority rhetoric. Briefly appointed Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 
ambiguously stated "for our own security, India should be well equipped."157 As 
a minority party, however, the BJP declares that India should be an overt nuclear 
weapons power. While the BJP was not in a position to take action on the 
nuclear weapons issue during their brief period of leadership, the softening of 
nuclear rhetoric demonstrates that, given the chance, the BJP may not develop 
an overt nuclear weapons posture for India. 
Implication: The United States should encourage political stability 
through economic cooperation. Without publicly claiming a political 
preference, the United States should encourage Indian participation in the global 
market. 
157 
"Potential Hindu Premier Says India Must be "Well-Equipped," International News, 
14 May 1996. 
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Finding: The Indian concern of economic growth and stability 
outweighs their defense aspirations. The end of the cold war helped 
generate aspirations of regional hegemony and power projection in the Indian 
defense community. Plans of nuclear propelled submarines and aircraft carriers 
dominated post-cold war Indian naval planners. Fiscal realities, however, have 
all but destroyed any Indian hopes of power projection beyond its immediate 
borders. Policy makers have demonstrated that a growing economy and 
domestic security is more important than defense spending. In addition to 
conventional defense cuts, India's nuclear power program also suffers from 
declining budgets. India's atomic energy budget has fallen 70 percent in the 
past ten years. 158 
Implication: The United States should consider trading conventional 
weapons with India. India's conventional forces stabilize South Asia. 
Insufficient Indian conventional forces generate Pakistani aspirations of 
unification with Kashmir and fuel arguments that India needs a nuclear deterrent. 
U.S.-Indian security cooperation could bolster Indian conventional power and 
stabilize the region. 
C. INDIA WILL MAINTAIN AN AMBIGUOUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSTURE 
Given current security, political, international, and economic pressures, 
India will continue to maintain an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture in the 
foreseeable future. The following contingent generalizations, however, provide 
future indicators for changes in India's nuclear policy. 
158 Arnett, "India's Nuclear brownout," 16. 
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1. Nuclear Weapons Denunciation Becomes More Likely If ... 
* Indian elites realize that India's energy shortage is caused by its inefficient 
nuclear power program. 
*India perceives that Indo-Pakistani nuclear parity in Pakistan's best interests. 
* the world embraces time-bounded nuclear disarmament negotiations. 
2. An Overt Nuclear Weapons Posture Becomes More Likely If ..... 
* the BJP comes to power, with a clear majority. 
*there is a re-militarization of the Sino-Indian border. 
*India's economy improves, with several years of sustained economic growth. 
*if Pakistan tests or deploys a nuclear weapon. 
D. CONCLUSION 
India has maintained an ambiguous nuclear weapons posture for over 
twenty years. It is the only nation to test a nuclear weapon without continuing its 
nuclear program to weapons development This thesis concludes that India is 
likely to continue displaying its ambiguous nuclear weapons posture. While the 
post-cold war world has witnessed new pressures on India, the motivations for 
India's nuclear option are the same. International arms control efforts continue 
to ignore India's desires for global nuclear disarmament. Border disputes with 
nuclear capable Pakistan, and nuclear power China persist. The high costs of 
nuclear weapons, and a consistent commitment to global disarmament continue 
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to contribute to Indian nuclear restraint. While the pressures on India's nuclear 
policy have changed, the myths of nuclear security and influence remain. 
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